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This paper uses the Ethiopian Rural Household Survey to examine the gender 
dimensions of public works.  The first part of the paper uses three rounds of a panel 
conducted in 1994/95 to explore the determinants of participation in, days worked, 
wages, and earnings from wage labor, food-for-work (FFW), and self-employment.  The 
second part analyzes public works data collected in 1997, together with program data 
collected in 2003. 
 
FFW operates in a similar fashion to other labor markets in Ethiopia, where 
female participation is low.  Gender differences are important in the participation 
decision, but operate differently in different types of labor markets.  Better-educated 
women are more likely to participate in the wage labor market, while higher livestock 
holdings diminish participation more for women.  Females with more schooling are also 
more likely to participate in FFW.  Men’s and women’s participation in FFW and self-
employment responds differently to household and community shocks.  After controlling 
for selection, in which gender plays an important role, gender disadvantages in the wage 
labor market and FFW are insignificant.  Returns to schooling and height are consistently 
positive in both wage labor and FFW, suggesting returns to human capital investment, 
even in the low-skill labor markets of rural Ethiopia.  
   
Program characteristics significantly affect participation, with differential effects 
on men and women.  Participation, days worked, wages, and earnings vary according to 
the type of project.  Relative to infrastructure projects, water, social services, and other 
projects decrease participation probabilities.  Distance has a strong negative effect on 
women’s participation relative to males. 
   1
1. Introduction 
 
Public works or workfare programs provide short-term employment at low wages 
for unskilled and semi-skilled workers on labor-intensive projects such as road 
construction and maintenance, irrigation infrastructure, reforestation, and soil 
conservation (Subbarao 2001).  They have been used across Asia, Africa, and Latin 
America to provide income transfers to the poor, to enable the poor to smooth 
consumption against income shocks, and to create assets by constructing much-needed 
infrastructure, which can also generate employment through second-round effects.  Given 
their long history, it is no surprise that debates on public works continue to this day.  
Recurrent issues in public works are the pattern of participation, the timing and type of 
project creation, the possibility of leakage to non-target groups, the distribution of 
benefits from assets created, and the technical efficiency of the assets themselves (Clay 
1986). 
Recently, policymakers have begun to pay attention to the gender dimensions of 
this debate.  The issue of gender differences in participation in public works program has 
arisen for a number of reasons.  First, if public funds are used to provide safety net 
mechanisms, women should have equal access to such risk-coping opportunities (Swamy 
2001).  Second, there is a large and growing literature that resources in the hands of 
women have a larger favorable impact on household food security and investments in 
children’s health, nutrition, and education (Haddad, Hoddinott, and Alderman 1997; 
Quisumbing 2004).  Public works schemes may provide such resources to poor women, 
and the presence of “outside options” such as public employment schemes may improve 
women’s bargaining power within the household.  Third, if women are more vulnerable   2
to income and other shocks because of the absence of insurance mechanisms (e.g., lack of 
assets to be used as collateral, ill health, shorter duration of paid employment) there may 
even be justification for targeting such employment opportunities to women.   
In a review of the gender dimensions of public works programs, Swamy (2001) 
identifies three issues related to women’s access to the direct and indirect benefits from 
public employment schemes:  (1) whether or not women have equal access to direct wage 
employment benefits; (2) factors of design and implementation that determine women’s 
participation; and (3) whether women benefit equally from the assets created by public 
works.  However, the existing literature has very little evidence on these issues, partly 
because most public works studies have not been designed to look beyond quantifying 
men’s and women’s participation in public works, to the determinants of women’s 
participation, especially programmatic factors that affect women’s participation. 
Are programs on the ground consistent with objectives to increase women’s 
participation in the employment, income, and asset creation benefits of public works?  
What are the determinants of participation in public works, versus participation in other 
income-earning activities?  Do men and women have equal probabilities of participation 
in such programs, controlling for other characteristics that may affect participation?  Are 
the incentives to participate different for men and women?  More important, are programs 
designed to encourage equal participation, and what program features are responsible for 
increasing women’s participation?
1 
                                                 
1 “Equal” participation may need to be defined as proportional to the number of men and women who are 
looking for work, since it is possible that a greater proportion of women will not be looking for places in 
public works programs.  Alternatively, public works programs can be compared to other labor markets.  We 
take the second approach in this paper.    3
This paper uses two related data sets from rural Ethiopia to examine the gender 
dimensions of public works.  The first part of the paper uses data from three rounds of a 
panel conducted between 1994 and 1995 to explore the determinants of participation in, 
days worked, wages, and earnings from income-earning activities, including wage labor, 
food-for-work, and self-employment.  By comparing participation in different types of 
off-farm labor market activities, we investigate whether food for work—the primary 
modality of public works implementation in Ethiopia—differs from other labor markets 
in terms of men’s and women’s participation and earnings.  The second part of the paper 
uses a specially-designed module on public works that was administered in 1997 to the 
same survey households during the fourth round of the panel, in conjunction with 
program data collected from the communities in 2003.  This module also delves more 
closely into the reasons for participation and non-participation in public works, and 
whether these reasons differ by gender.   
 
2. Public Works, Food Aid, and Food for Work in Ethiopia 
 
2.1 An overview of safety net mechanisms in Ethiopia 
Discussions of public works cannot be isolated from food aid issues, especially in 
Ethiopia.
2  Public works, typically food-for-work (FFW) with part or whole payment in 
kind to project workers, have become the most important use of food aid (Dawson 1981; 
                                                 
2 This paper does not deal with other relevant issues regarding food aid, such as targeting and program 
placement (Jayne et al. 2002), its effects on vulnerability (Dercon and Krishnan 2001), possible 
disincentive effects (Hoddinott 2003), and nutritional impacts (Yamano, Alderman, and Christiaensen 
2003; Quisumbing 2003).   4
WFP/CFA 21/5 1986, cited in Clay 1986).
3  This is especially true in Ethiopia, a drought-
stricken economy with one of the lowest per capita incomes in the world, and the second 
largest recipient of food aid in the world (second to Bangladesh).Ethiopia’s official food 
aid policy states that no able-bodied person should receive food aid without working on a 
community project in return, supplemented by targeted free food aid for those who 
cannot work.  Free food distribution (FD) programs distribute cereals (wheat, maize, and 
sorghum) directly to households, while participants in FFW programs typically work in 
community development programs, such as roads, terraces, dams, and local infrastructure 
construction.  Together, FFW and FD are virtually the only publicly provided safety net 
in Ethiopia (Dercon and Krishnan 2001).  The government of Ethiopia’s goal is to devote 
80 percent of its food assistance resources to FFW programs, using the principle of self-
targeting (FDRE 1996), although recent estimates indicate that only 63 percent of relief 
food was distributed through employment-generation schemes (Jayne et al. 2002).   
In terms of program placement, the government distinguishes between two types 
of regions:  (1) those in which the agricultural sector shows dynamism and potential for 
growth, and weather shocks are infrequent; and (2) those that are chronically subject to 
periodic monsoon failures (Subbarao and Smith 2003).  Programs covering vulnerable 
groups are located in 156 woredas in four regions in the second group of regions, namely 
Oromiya, Amhara, Tigray, and SNNPR (Southern Nations and Nationalities People’s 
Region).
4  These four regions comprise over 80 percent of Ethiopia.  Tigray is the most 
                                                 
3 Note, however, that some of the largest food-for-work programs, such as India’s National Rural 
Employment Programme, state-level Employment Guarantee Schemes and Food-for-Work Programmes, 
have been financed from domestic sources (Clay 1986).  In Africa, most public works programs are donor-
funded. 
4 The region is the largest regional unit in Ethiopia.  Regions are disaggregated into zones, the next highest 
regional unit.  Woredas are relatively small regional units that correspond to districts.   5
vulnerable to famine and food shortages, while most of the first type of region are found 
in Amhara, Oromiya, and SNNPR.  Vulnerable woredas are identified using an Early 
Warning System that has evolved fairly efficiently over time.  Within each woreda, 
households eligible for different programs are identified using both administrative and 
community targeting methods.  Subbarao and Smith (2003) stress that these measures are 
intended to address transitional food insecurity caused by rainfall shortages.  Initiatives 
aimed at chronic food insecurity are sparse on the ground and usually consist of donor-
funded rural/agricultural development programs.  The main area of focus and intervention 
has been on addressing short-term acute food shortages brought about by monsoon 
failures, mainly through the provision of relief food.  
Four major safety net programs have been in operation in Ethiopia for quite some 
time:  two that involve a work requirement, and two that do not.  The first two are (1) 
food-for-work (FFW) and (2) employment generation schemes (EGS), both of which 
have work requirements, and the second two are (1) free food distribution (also called 
gratuitous relief) and (2) school feeding.  A general distinction between FFW and EGS is 
that FFW projects secure a basic and steady activity level, while EGS provides additional 
inputs at times of increased need (WFP 1998: 13-14, quoted in Humphrey 1998). 
Among the programs that involve a work requirement, FFW has had a longer 
history, having begun in 1980.  The program is funded by WFP, and is carried out in 
selected vulnerable woredas in Tigray, SNNPR, Oromiya and Amhara.  Except for 
Tigray, these regions are also surplus food producing regions in the country with pockets 
of food insecure or famine prone areas.  Between 1999-2003, on average, over 1.4 
million individuals participated annually in FFW.  Each participant received a food   6
transfer (as wages) amounting to $27.67.  During this period, WFP donated food valued 
at $35.6 million to the program, with a government counterpart of $12.9 million 
(Subbarao and Smith 2003: 12).  Thus, unlike EGS (discussed below), FFW involves 
greater government participation, is better coordinated, and has been sustained over a 
long period of time.  FFW targets both geographic areas and households.  It selects 
communities where the soil is degraded and deforested and where there is a shortage of 
water.  Within these areas, application of targeting principles suggests that poor people 
would self-select themselves into the program when the program wage is lower than the 
market wage.  In practice, where communities determine wages in FFW, they have not 
been set below the market wage, and sometimes even exceed it.  Instead, days are 
rationed to provide employment opportunities for more households (Sharp 1997)—and 
thus it is not surprising that when the program wage exceeds the market wage, some non-
poor farmers may also participate.  Because the program by its very nature targets the 
able-bodied poor, it benefits labor-rich households, while some very poor households 
with no adult labor may not be able to benefit from the program. 
The Employment Generation Program (also known as Employment Generation 
Scheme, EGS) was introduced more recently in 1993.  According to most recent 
available estimates, the program expanded from 33 woredas and about 200,000 workers 
in September 2001 to 57 woredas and about 600,000 workers in April 2002.  EGS has 
provided short-term employment to over 200,000 annually since 1997 (Subbarao and 
Smith 2003: 11).  The Guidelines governing the EGS stipulate that 80 percent of all food 
aid is to be allocated to EGS activity, with the balance of 20 percent to be distributed 
without a work requirement to vulnerable groups who cannot provide physical labor in   7
exchange.  The Guidelines also stipulate the wage rate (15 kg of food (wheat/maize) per 
person per month) and other norms for participation for pregnant and lactating women.  
In practice, a number of evaluations have pointed out that in most locations EGS 
degenerated into free distribution, and food meant for EGS was distributed without a 
work requirement, largely due to lack of any non-food budgetary support at the woreda to 
implement a workfare program (Subbarao and Smith 2003).  Wage rates offered were 
generally lower than the stipulated 15 kg of food (wheat/maize) per person per month, 
with most participants never receiving more than 12.5 kg of food per person per month.  
Unlike FFW, the program operates almost entirely with donated food; the cost to the 
government is negligible. 
 
2.2 Targeting and effectiveness of food aid 
Although communities are supposed to be selected based on chronic need, one of 
the few systematic studies of program placement of food aid in Ethiopia found that food-
aid allocations display a large degree of spatial rigidity over time, and are not necessarily 
concentrated among the poorest regions (Jayne et al. 2002).  Contrary to the hypothesis 
that some regions are chronically needy, the study finds that needs shift geographically 
from one year to the next, but that fixed costs in setting up operations and in identifying 
needs lead to a degree of inertia in the location of food aid programs over time.  Thus, 
having a food aid program in a community increases the probability that the program will 
continue, due to bureaucratic inertia. 
Within communities, food aid is targeted using three methods:  administrative 
targeting, using such indicators as asset or livestock ownership, age and gender, 
nutritional status, access to resources such as land and family labor; self-targeting,   8
typically implemented using wages below the market wage rate and “inferior” goods; and 
community-based targeting, based on community decisions about the eligibility of 
households to participate in food aid programs (Clay, Molla, and Habtewold 1999). 
However, application of administrative criteria has been haphazard.  Within these 
three broad approaches, criteria for the selection of participants ranged from reported 
poverty and the capacity to work, size of household plot, sometimes poverty alone, and 
certainly in some cases, the whims of the project coordinators (Humphrey 1998).  Self-
targeting has not also worked in practice.  Although the wage rate has been fixed at a 
modest level of 3 kg of food per day (in some locations only 2.5 kg a day), some nonpoor 
participants have participated in workfare programs.  Barrett, Holden, and Clay (2001) 
argue that the inclusion of nonpoor participants is not due to mismanagement, but to 
structural factors associated with imperfect factor markets in rural Ethiopia.  Higher 
income households are endowed with more labor per unit of land or animal.  Due to poor 
factor markets in land and livestock, these labor-abundant households have lower 
marginal labor productivity on their farms, depressing their own reservation wage rates 
so that they find low workfare wages rates acceptable. 
In many cases, the desire to spread the benefits of FFW thinly has led 
communities to share individual rations among a large number of households (Sharp 
1997).  If quotas are small, for example, the local committee may cut the number of 
workplaces or rations given to each household rather than reduce the number of families 
assisted, so payments would no longer be directly linked to work effort.  In some areas, 
FFW is also organized on a part-time basis so that participants can continue with farming   9
or other work.  Able-bodied participants who are still farming could therefore devote less 
time to FFW and thus would earn less than those without outside activities. 
Overall, it appears the mode and timeliness of payment are a greater problem than 
targeting.  A norm of 3 kg of food and 120 g of oil per day is considered adequate to 
provide 1,800 calories to a family of six.  In practice, some times and in some locations, 
only 2.5 kg of food was paid.  In other locations oil was not provided.   Participants who 
received oil typically sold their entire oil receipts and bought other food items such as 
salt, sugar and more grain, incurring significant transaction costs.  Most female 
participants asked for more grain rather than oil.  Nevertheless, most participants opted 
for food rather than cash as a mode of payment.  Participants in the cash-for-works 
program implemented in the late 1980s often traveled long distances to buy food, and 
risked confiscation of their grain at check points on the return journey (Aytenu and 
Aylieff 1993).  Delays in the payment of even these lower-than-norm wage payments 
were common; 76 percent of participants complained delays in payment (Humphrey 
1998).  Delays in payment can cause serious disruptions to beneficiaries and undermine 
the value of workfare as a safety net. 
Despite the many criticisms unearthed by evaluations of food aid, food aid has 
been shown to reduce vulnerability.  Dercon and Krishnan (2003), using a panel data set 
from Ethiopia, examine the extent to which food aid helps households smooth their 
consumption in the face of negative income shocks, while taking into account existing 
informal risk-sharing arrangements.  Their results indicate positive effects of food aid on 
consumption-smoothing, though largely via intra-village risk sharing and not through 
direct targeting.  In related work, Dercon and Krishnan (2001) find that the presence of a   10
food aid or FFW program in the village reduced the impact of a bad rainfall shock by 12 
percent—a small but significant effect.  Food aid (both FFW and FD) has positive 
nutritional impacts as well.  Using a panel data set from rural Ethiopia, Quisumbing 
(2003) finds positive impacts of both FFW and FD on weight for height.  Yamano, 
Alderman, and Christiaensen (2003), using three nationally-representative data sets from 
Ethiopia, find that food aid positively affects child growth, especially among 6-24 month 
olds who grew 1.6 cm faster on average in communities receiving food aid, than if no 
food aid had been available. 
 
2.3 Gender dimensions of food aid 
Despite the policy mandate of the World Food Programme (WFP), Ethiopia’s 
major food aid donor, towards women, there has been relatively little econometric 
analysis of the gender dimensions of public works in Ethiopia.
5  WFP has mandated that 
it will require women to control the family entitlement in 80 percent of WFP-handled and 
subcontracted operations, although actual practice suggests that most countries have not 
met this level (WFP 2003a).  This issue has been largely unexamined owing to the 
scarcity of gender-disaggregated data on participation and earnings.  Exceptions are 
studies by Yamano (2000) and Quisumbing (2003).  Using nationally representative data 
from Ethiopia, Yamano (2000) finds that FD tends to increase farm labor supply of girls, 
while FFW decreases it.  Another study using the same data set used in this paper 
(Quisumbing 2003) examined the impact of FFW and FD on child nutrition.  The study 
                                                 
5 Program evaluations such as those by Humphrey (1998) and Sharp (1997) have paid attention to the 
gender dimensions of FFW, such as participation of men and women, women’s preferred form of payment, 
and the intrahousehold distribution of workfare payments.  Neither evaluation conducted econometric 
analyses of the gender impact of FFW.   11
did not find significant differences in male and female participation in FFW and FD; 
however, it found that households seem to invest proceeds from FD, which can be 
interpreted as an increase in unearned income, in girls’ nutrition, while earnings from 
FFW are manifested in better nutrition in boys.  The effects of the gender of the aid 
recipient were not conclusive. 
 
3. Conceptual Framework 
 
A simple utility-maximizing model can be used to analyze the allocation of time 
to different activities, including work and leisure.  Suppose that the household utility 
function can be characterized as: 
  U = U(Xp, Xh, L),  (1) 
where Xp refers to market-purchased goods, Xh refers to home-produced goods, such as 
child health and nutrition, and L is leisure.  At this point we assume that the household 
has a single utility function, although we relax this assumption later.  We first make the 
simplifying assumption that home produced goods depend only on household labor 
supply, th.
6  That is, 
  Xh = f(th).   (2) 
Suppose that the household derives income from agricultural production, from 
wage labor, from self-employment, and from participation in FFW activities.  Suppose 
also that the household may be eligible to receive food aid through free distribution.  
Since free distribution does not require work, we can treat it like unearned income.
7   
The household income constraint can then be written as 
                                                 
6 This is similar to the exposition in Strauss and Thomas (1995) and Quisumbing (2003).  
7 This abstracts from the time costs of obtaining food aid through free distribution.   12
  pa.Qa(A, ta) + w (tw + ts + tf)+ N = pXp,  (3) 
where pa.Qa is the value of agricultural output, which is a function of land and other 
agricultural assets A and of time allocated to agricultural production ta; w.  tw is income 
from wage labor, where w is the market wage rate and tw is time spent in the labor 
market; w.ts  is income from self-employment activities, where, for simplicity, we assume 
that the return to labor in self-employment is the same as that on the labor market, w.  tf is 
income from FFW, which, for purposes of exposition, involves a wage rate that is equal 
to the market wage.  (In practice the wage rate may be lower for self-targeting purposes.)  
N is unearned income, which may include transfers such as those from FD.  We do not 
analyze FD separately in this paper.
8  Household income is spent on purchases of the 
market-produced good, Xp. 
The time of individuals in the household is allocated to time in own agricultural 
production, time spent in the wage labor market, time on self-employment activities, time 
on FFW activities, time producing home goods, and leisure.  Thus, the household time 
constraint is as follows: 
  T = ta + tw + ts+ tf + th + L.  (4) 
Incorporating the household time constraint into the income constraint, the full 
income constraint can be written as  
  pXp + w. L = w(T – tw + ts + tf) + (pa.Qa – w ta) + (phXh - w th) + N.  (5) 
That is, total consumption, including the value of time spent in leisure, cannot 
exceed full income.  Full income is the value of time available to all household members, 
returns from agricultural production, “profits” from home production, and nonlabor 
income N.  Maximizing equation (1) subject to the full income constraint yields reduced 
                                                 
8 See Quisumbing (2003) for an analysis of the nutritional effects of FFW and FD.   13
form demand functions for goods x and leisure L, which can be written as a function of 
prices, the vector of wages w, which includes both market wages and wages in FFW, and 
unearned income N, given the household’s asset levels: 
  x = x (p, w, N; A);  (6) 
  L = l(p, w, N; A).  (7) 
Suppose, however, that the household is composed of two individuals, m and f 
(for male and female, respectively), who do not have the same preferences, nor pool their 
incomes.  A collective model of the household would then be more appropriate, and the 
demand functions would be
9 
  xi = xi (p, w, Nm, Nf; Am, Af, am, af);  i = 0, m, f  (8) 
and 
  Li = Li (p, w, Nm, Nf; Am, Af, am, af);  i = m, f,  (9) 
where, in addition to wages and prices, the demand functions are conditioned on 
individual assets Am and Af and extrahousehold environmental parameters (EEPs) am and 
af.  The EEPs affect the relative desirability of being outside the household (e.g., being 
single) and may include access to common property resources and divorce laws.  Gender-
specific targeting practiced in many FFW programs could also be viewed as an EEP that 
increases women’s options outside marriage.  Moreover, if spouses do not pool incomes, 
lump sum transfers such as free food distribution could have different effects depending 
on whether the husband or the wife was the recipient.  For self-targeting purposes, wage 
rates in FFW programs should not be set higher than the prevailing market wage 
(Ravallion 1999; Subbarao 1997) although they may not necessarily improve women’s 
                                                 
9 See Haddad et al. (1997) for a review.  For a more detailed exposition and derivation of the reduced form 
demand functions, see Thomas (1990).   14
outside options if they are excessively low.  However, as will be discussed later, 
opportunities for women to participate in the labor market are rare in rural Ethiopia. 
Time allocation to various activities, including farm production, wage work, self-
employment, home goods production, and FFW, could then be expressed as a function of 
the above right-hand side variables.  In this paper, we investigate the determinants of 
participation in wage work, FFW, and self-employment, as well as the determinants of 
days worked and earnings in each activity.  We then investigate the effect of program 
variables, particularly those that might affect women’s propensity to participate in public 
works. 
 
4. Data and Empirical Specification 
 
4.1  Data 
As mentioned above, this paper uses three sources of data, all based on the 
Ethiopian Rural Household survey (ERHS).  We begin by providing an overview of the 
ERHS, then describe each of the data sources in detail.  The first three rounds of the 
ERHS were conducted in 1994/95 by the Department of Economics of Addis Ababa 
University (AAU) and the Centre for the Study of African Economies (CSAE) of Oxford 
University, building on an earlier survey conducted in 1989 by the International Food 
Policy Research Institute (IFPRI).  The 1997 round was undertaken by AAU in 
collaboration with IFPRI and CSAE.  The ERHS covered approximately 1,500 
households in 15 villages all across Ethiopia.  While sample households within villages 
were randomly selected, the villages themselves were chosen to ensure that the major   15
farming systems are represented.
10  While we do not employ any weighting procedure in 
pooling the observations, the sample is representative of the population of three out of 
four agroclimatic groups (excluding pastoralists).  Thus, although the 15 villages 
included in the sample are not statistically representative of rural Ethiopia as a whole, 
they are quite diverse and include all major agroecological, ethnic, and religious groups.
11 
The questionnaires for the first four rounds consist of a series of core modules on 
various issues such as consumption expenditures, wealth, income, and health, as well as a 
module on anthropometric measurements for all household members.  The questionnaire 
used in the 1997 round includes the original core modules, supplemented with new 
modules specifically designed to address intrahousehold allocation issues.  These 
modules were designed not only to be consistent with information gathered in the core 
modules, but also to complement individual-specific information.
12  These modules 
focused on conditions at marriage, particularly assets at marriage.
13  The ERHS also has 
detailed self-reported information on different kinds of shocks, based on recall of events 
in the last cropping season and the relevant harvest. These are used to construct indices of 
adverse occurrences affecting crop and livestock production, which we describe in detail 
in the empirical specification.  Typically, the respondent was the head of the household 
                                                 
10 About 400 households in six sites were initially surveyed by IFPRI in 1989; these were selected from 
drought-prone areas for the study by Webb, von Braun, and Yohannes (1992).  Three more sites (one 
village in Wollo and two villages in Tigray) were added in 1994-1995 to include areas north of Debre 
Berhan, which could not be surveyed in 1989 due to military conflict.  Six other sites were also added to 
cover the main agroclimatic zones and farming systems of the richer parts of the country.  The selection of 
new sites is described in Kebede (1994). 
11 See Fafchamps and Quisumbing (2002) for a discussion of the representativeness of the sample. 
12 These are described in more detail in Fafchamps and Quisumbing (2002). 
13 Because assets at marriage may determine spouses’ bargaining power within marriage (Quisumbing and 
Maluccio 2003; Frankenberg and Thomas 2001), a variety of assets brought to the marriage were recorded, 
as well as all transfers made at the time of marriage.  Values of assets at marriage were converted to 1997 
birr using the consumer price index.  See Fafchamps and Quisumbing (2002) for details.   16
although questions on bargaining power were administered separately to men and 
women. 
The geographical location of the surveyed villages is depicted in Figure 1.  Most 
surveyed villages are placed along a North-South axis.  This ensures a good coverage of 
the various agroclimatic zones that characterize the Ethiopian highlands where the bulk 
of the population lives.  Arid lowlands and other regions that are particularly hard to 
reach, such as the western part of the country along the Sudanese border, were excluded 
from the sample for cost reasons.  This may limit the policy conclusions on targeting that 
can be drawn. 
 
Data from “off-farm and business activities” module 
Each survey round obtained information on income earned from various activities 
in the past four months, including wage and salary work in a number of different 
occupations, FFW, and self-employment.
14  Wage employment is dominated by 
agricultural labor in others’ farms, while self-employment activities include weaving, 
spinning, milling, trading, handicrafts, and transport.  For each activity, information was 
collected on the number of days worked, whether the payment was in cash or in kind, the 
value of cash payments, the quantity and unit of in-kind payments, and the identity of the 
income recipient.  Most participants in FFW received their payments in kind, typically in 
wheat, maize, sorghum, and cooking oil; all in-kind receipts were converted to cash  
                                                 
14 The off-farm and business activities module is administered to the household head, who answers for all 
relevant household members, identified by their ID codes from the household roster.  A given household 
member can engage in more than one activity.   17
Figure 1—Ethiopian Rural Household Survey (ERHS) sites 
Source:  UNDP-EUE 1998. 
Note:  All borders and survey site locations are approximate. 
 
 
equivalents using the village-level price in that specific period.  We are unable to analyze 
agricultural labor, the most important activity, because information was collected only at 
the household level.  The bulk of agricultural labor is performed by men, with the 
exception of so-called “women’s crops” such as enset (false banana), which is grown in 
the South.  Women care for livestock and control the proceeds from dairying and other 
livestock by-products.   18
In this paper, we limit our analysis to villages that had food-for-work activities in 
a specific round (see Table 1) between Rounds 1-3.
15  Thus, our analysis examines 
participation in off-farm labor markets—off-farm wage labor, FFW, and self-
employment—conditional on a FFW program being in the village.  We do not address 
issues of program placement in the paper, and because FFW programs do not operate 
continuously, villages included in the sample will differ from round to round.  Because 
we want to compare other labor markets to FFW, our results should not be taken as 
representative of labor markets in Ethiopia, but of labor markets in villages where FFW is 
operating. 
Table 1 presents descriptive information on participation in and earnings from 
wage labor, FFW, and self-employment by round, for males and females 15-65 years of 
age.  Although participation rates are low in general, both wage labor and FFW are 
clearly dominated by men.  Overall, 26 percent of men participate in off-farm labor 
markets, compared to 14 percent of women; individuals do participate in more than one 
off-farm income-earning activity.  Participation in the wage labor market is 9 percent for 
men, and only 2 percent for women, and around 13 percent of men and 5 percent of 
women participate in FFW.  In contrast, self-employment, although it has low overall 
participation rates, has the smallest gender gap in participation.  About 7 percent of men 
and 8 percent of women on average are engaged in self-employment activities, and in 
each round, participation rates are higher for women. 
                                                 
15 We decided not to include Round 4 in this analysis because the timing of the Round 4 survey did not 
correspond to any of those in the previous three rounds, which were designed to cover an entire agricultural 
year.  Moreover, the incidence of FFW seemed unusually low compared to the previous three rounds, 
probably owing to better economic conditions in 1997.   19
Conditional on participation, men and women work similar days in most 
activities.  Men worked 41 days in wage labor over a four-month period, while women 
worked 43 days.  In FFW, men worked 34 days, and women 30; in self-employment, 
conditional on working, men worked 46 days and women, 44 days.  Among those who 
report earnings, however, men earn almost twice as much as women.  In the wage labor 
market, men earn 2.7 times what women earn, and in self-employment, men earn 1.95 
times women’s self-employment earnings.  The gender gap in earnings is smallest in 
FFW, where men have only a 4 percent advantage, on average, although there are 
variations across rounds, owing to the specific programs that were in place.  Since, 
conditional on participation, women do not work significantly fewer days than men, 
returns to male labor must be substantially higher for them to have earnings differentials 
of this magnitude.  The descriptive information also suggests that earnings are relatively 
more equal in FFW than in other labor market activities.  Does this tentative conclusion 
hold, once other personal and household characteristics are controlled for?  We 
investigate this further through using regression analysis. 
 
Data from 1997 public works module 
Aside from information on off-farm income-earning activities, the 1997 round 
included a module that obtained information on individual participation in public works 
programs, whether for food, cash, or as part of community labor arrangements.  The 
recall period for this module was longer than the off-farm income-earning activities 
module—12 months (13 Ethiopian months), rather than four months.  Owing to the 
longer recall period, this module would tend to capture a higher degree of participation in 
public works than the income-earning activities module.  This module aimed to follow up   20
the earlier IFPRI studies on public works (von Braun, Teklu, and Webb 1991, 1992) 
based on the 1989 survey and the first round of the 1994 surveys (Seyoum et al. 1995).  
This module has questions regarding desire to participate in public works, reasons for not 
participating, reasons for not being hired if one applied, reasons for not working, as well 
as information on distance to public works, type of public works project, implementing 
agency, quantity and type of payment, and preferred type of payment.  Unlike the earlier 
public works data, these questions were asked about all individuals above age 10, not just 
participants in public works, with the household head typically answering for the other 
household members.  The new module thus focuses on individual participation and 
information on individual payments.  However, most respondents did not know the 
agencies implementing the public works project, and tended to describe the project in 
generic terms (e.g., type of project), making it impossible to identify individual projects 
from the program data.  While the information is not comparable to those in the previous 
rounds (1994/95), it provides a clearer picture of programmatic features of public works. 
 
Program data from key informant interviews 
Because the 1997 questionnaire did not obtain information on other program 
features that might be relevant to women’s decision to participate, we commissioned a 
team of graduate students from Oxford University to collect additional information on the 
public works activities identified in the 1997 survey (Krishnan 2003).  Using a checklist 
and a short questionnaire, the graduate students interviewed local leaders in 7 of the 15 
survey villages in September-October 2003.  Because respondents often did not know the 
specific agency that funded the public works activity, the team had to rely on more   21
intensive questioning of local leaders, who would be more likely to remember than the 
survey respondents.
16 
Some aspects of the fieldwork need to be borne in mind when using and 
interpreting these data.  First, when the team was trying to collect program data on 
specific projects, they found that many projects were poorly identified as being “food-
for-work WFP” or government (Krishnan 2003).  Typically, WFP channels its operations 
through government agencies or NGOs and thus a project may not be identifiable as a 
WFP project (Robin Jackson, personal communication).  Furthermore, the term “food-
for-work” is also not a term used in policy work in Ethiopia.  The typical distinction used 
by the government and indeed the WFP is between EGS (employment generation 
schemes) and free food aid, where employment generation schemes are expected to 
generate jobs as well as create public goods (Jayne et al. 2002), while free food aid (or 
free distribution) is given to individuals who cannot work. In any case, up to now there is 
not one single operational guideline on how programs should be structured, targeted, as 
distinguished from policy statements giving the intentions of providing carefully targeted 
programs.  In fact, in practice, a multitude of rules exist that make it hard to describe 
“the” typical public works program run by the government, with or without support of the 
WFP.  Finally, FFW is definitely not just a feature of programs implemented by the WFP 
with the government—other government and other organizations use the same principle. 
Thus, the team decided to implement a short checklist of questions focusing on 
specific programmatic features (see Box 1). 
                                                 
16 In five villages, the principal informant was the chairman of the village or Peasant Association.  In one 
village, the team interviewed a group of ten people, and in another, a group of eight.   22
Box 1. Checklist of questions for the key informant interviews, 2003 
 
1.  Location: 
2.  Date visited: 
3.  Primary interview respondent: 
4.  Title if applicable: 
 
I.  Project details for 1997 project 
1.  Implementing agency 
2.  Financing source 
3.  Details of projects (objectives, activities, etc…) 
4.  Type of work 
5.  Typical Number of employees 
 
    II.   Participation 
1.  How long could you work for? 
2.  How was this allocated? 
3.  Was it perceived as fair? 
4.  Did women participate? 
5.  Mix men and women 
6.  Payment for project 
7.  Market wage at the time 
8.  Which type of payment preferred 
9.  Were any criteria used to select? 
10. Was the programme targeted to the needy and poor? 
 
  III.   Women’s Participation 
1.  Were crechers present? 
2.  Were women targeted particularly? 
3.  Were women specifically informed? 
4.  Were women paid the same? 
5.  Did women dot he same jobs? 
 
   IV.    Project Awareness 
1.  How were the people informed of projects? 
2.  Were any groups specifically targeted? 
 
  Other Notes 
 
Source:  Krishnan (2003). 
   23
To make the fieldwork feasible, they concentrated on the seven villages with the 
highest concentration of work episodes as reported in the 1997 public works module 
(Table 2).
17  Ninety-eight percent of the program participation episodes took place in 
these villages, which are indicated in bold in the table.  In three others, some programs 
took place, but in numbers that are extremely small, and often in unspecified programs.  
Using the checklist and open-ended interviews, the team generated an Excel database that 
was later coded by the authors to create variables for the descriptive and regression 
analysis. 
There are some discrepancies between the impressions created in the community 
level and household-level data and the findings from the detailed conversations with key 
informants.  In all villages, Peasant Association offices were first contacted, and most 
conversations were with the Peasant Association heads or their deputies.  This will 
definitely have affected the answers to more sensitive or subjective questions, such as 
“was the program perceived fair,” or elements of the gender dimensions of the program.  
The reason is that the PA officials were almost always involved in the actual selection of 
household and individual participants in public works program.  Also, communities 
differed substantially in terms of how the programs were actually functioning, for 
example in terms of targeting, the relationship between market wages and payments, etc.  
In at least one case, Koro Degaga, it felt that “textbook” or “rulebook” answers were 
given, while in others, the targeting was surprising (such as the strict rotation in Imdibir).  
                                                 
17 Note in Table 2 that the correspondence between work episodes and implementing organizations is not 
exact.  In most villages where programs took place, different program organizations were identified, but it 
is not necessarily clear whether they were indeed multiple programs.  For example, there is in principle no 
budget for Peasant Associations to organize programs themselves, but they are typically involved in one 
way or another for the allocation of jobs.  Similarly, FFW is not necessarily a type or organization behind a 
program, but rather a way of implementing programs for different organizations.   24
Moreover, the time lag between the program interviews, which took place in 2003, and 
the actual implementation of the projects (which would have been in 1996, since the 1997 
survey involved a one-year recall period) inevitably created recall bias.  In fact, in many 
of the interviews, the memories of the interviewees or anyone else that could be reached 
were rather vague on some of the detail asked for, not least in areas where different 
programs had existed, clearly often with different implementing agencies, including from 
the government.  The decentralization that started in 1996, with gradually more power 
devolved up to (at this moment) the woredas, also meant that details would have changed 
simply by changes of people in charge.  Owing to the time lag between the interviews 
and the survey, as well as the fact that data collected was at the village level, we decided 
not to use the 2003 key informant data in regressions, but to use them as a source of 
information to characterize programs that were being implemented at the time of the 
survey. 
 
4.2 Empirical specification 
Participation in the labor market is influenced by individual, household, and 
community characteristics.  Participation in “special” labor markets, such as those created 
through FFW, is also affected by targeting mechanisms.  As mentioned earlier, FFW is 
targeted using administrative targeting, self-targeting, and community-based targeting.  
Thus, FFW receipts are not random and will depend on individual, household, and 
community characteristics. 
   25
Determinants of participation 
We adopt a simple reduced form specification to analyze the participation 
decision and estimate a probit equation of the form: 
  yij’* = $o + $’1Xi + $’2Xh + $’3Xv + gij,   yij = 1 if yij*> 0, 0 otherwise,  (10) 
where yij’*, the labor force participation of the ith individual in the jth activity (wage 
labor, FFW, and self-employment), is modeled as a binary variable.
18  It is a function of a 
vector of exogenous variables Xi which includes individual characteristics such as sex, 
age, age squared, height (a measure of long-run nutritional status) and years of schooling, 
which are likely to influence the probability of participation; household variables Xh such 
as household size (in natural logarithms), the household’s age and sex composition, 
which would capture the need for child care or old-age support, as well as the availability 
of other working members; household wealth (land, and livestock), and household 
rainfall and livestock shocks, and community variables Xv such as rainfall  shocks.  Xh 
also contains “history” variables that capture the household’s past experience with food 
aid, since bureaucratic inertia or past experience is an important determinant of food aid 
receipts (Jayne et al. 2002).  Xv could also contain characteristics of public works 
programs in the village; we explore this specification in Section 5.  We include (but do 
not report) village and round dummies to proxy local labor market conditions.  Means 
and standard deviations of dependent variables and regressors are presented in Table 3. 
Individual characteristics.  Sex, age, age squared, and years of schooling are the 
typical set of individual characteristics included in participation equations.  We include 
height as an indicator of the individual’s long-term nutritional status, which influences 
                                                 
18 We do not take into account the possibility that activity choice may be interdependent; however, this 
does not bias the estimation since we estimate reduced forms without any endogenous right-hand-side 
variables.  We will explore the interdependence of activity choice in future work.   26
the individual’s ability to do physical work, and which may affect selection into workfare 
versus free distribution programs.  We use height rather than BMI because BMI (weight 
(in kilograms) divided by height (in meters) squared) is subject to short-term fluctuations.  
Weight-based measures may be affected by participation in strenuous activities and work 
effort in the short run, and thus would be endogenous. 
Household demographic characteristics.  These include the age and education of 
the household head, whether the household is female headed, the natural logarithm of 
household size, and the age-sex composition of the household.  We pay special attention 
to whether labor force participation is influenced by the presence of infants and toddlers 
(age 0-3), preschoolers (age 3-7), and the elderly (age 65 and over), as well as other 
females of working age (working age males are the excluded category). 
Assets.  To proxy household wealth, we use land area and the value of livestock in 
Round 1.  Land and livestock are less likely to be endogenous to Round 1 decisions, as 
they are relatively more difficult to accumulate than smaller assets such as consumer 
goods.
19 
Household shocks.  The broad categories of shocks are rainfall shocks, non-rain 
shocks (mostly common problems related to pests, flooding insects, and animal trampling 
or weed damage), and livestock shocks.
 20  We concentrate on two types of shocks:  
rainfall and livestock shocks.  The individual rainfall index was constructed to measure 
the farm-specific experience related to rainfall in the preceding season, based on a series 
                                                 
19 We also used assets at marriage in a previous version of this paper.  Assets at marriage are arguably the 
most exogenous measure to use, but these were collected on smaller sample of households than the asset 
and livestock data.  Results using assets at marriage and land and livestock in round 1 are not qualitatively 
different. 
20 This description is taken mostly from Dercon and Krishnan (2000); for comparability, we followed a 
very similar methodology for creating the shock index.   27
of questions such as whether the rains came on time, whether there was enough rain on 
one’s fields at the beginning of the rainy season, whether rains stopped on time, and 
whether it rained near harvest time.  Responses to each of the questions (either yes or no) 
were coded as favorable or unfavorable rainfall outcomes, and averaged over the number 
of questions asked so that the best outcome would be equal to one and the worst, zero.  
Similar questions were also asked regarding livestock disease, scarcity of water, and 
scarcity of grazing land that might have adversely affected livestock holdings.  Relatively 
speaking, livestock disease was quite important in the first round of data collection, 
particularly in the South. 
  Community shocks.  The individual rainfall index was aggregated up to the village 
level using leave-out means.  While a preferred alternative might have been to use 
village-specific rainfall data, rainfall data are collected in rainfall stations, not at the 
village level, and were not available for some villages.
21 
  Past experience with food aid.  We also include four variables capturing the 
“history” of food aid receipts:  amounts of wheat (in kilograms) received during the 
1983-84 famine, amounts of wheat received in the past three years prior to Round 1, 
whether the household received other kinds of food aid during the 1983-84 famine, and 
whether the household received other kinds of food aid in the last three years. 
  Because it is possible that the effects of these variables impact differently on 
individuals because of their sex, we also estimate a modified version of equation (10): 
  yij’* = go + g’1Gi + g’2Xi + g’3 Gi Xi + g’4Xh + g’5 Gi Xh  
  + g’6Xv + g’7 Gi Xv + mij,   yij = 1 if yij*> 0, 0 otherwise,  (11) 
                                                 
21 We examined the correlation of community rainfall shocks with household rainfall and livestock shocks.  
The pair wise correlation coefficient of the community rainfall shock with household rainfall is 0.4903, 
while that with livestock shocks is 0.1408.   28
where Gi is a gender dummy (= 1 if the person is female), and Gi Xi, Gi Xh, and Gi Xv are 
interaction terms between gender and individual, household, and village characteristics.  
We test whether the interactions are jointly significant, which implies that individual, 
household, and village characteristics have a differential impact on men and women. 
  Determinants of days worked, wages per day, and earnings.  We also have data 
on days worked and earnings for wage labor, FFW, and self-employment.  To take into 
account the endogeneity of participation in labor market activities, we use the Heckman 
procedure to correct for selectivity (Heckman 1979).  We assume that the determinants of 
days worked, wages, and earnings operate on two levels.  First, the individual decides 
whether or not to participate in the specific labor market activity; second, conditional on 
participation, the individual decides on days worked, earnings, and imputed wages per 
day (computed by dividing total earnings by days worked).  That is, we estimate 
  Eij = Xiß + u1ij,   (12) 
where Eij is a vector of days worked, earnings, and imputed wages per day, by the ith 
individual in the jth activity, estimated separately for wage labor, food for work, and self-
employment.  Eij is observed only if  
  zij + u2ij > 0,  (13) 
where u1 ~ N(0, s), u2 ~ N(0, 1), and corr(u1, u2) = ?. 
Equation (12) pertains to the determinants of individual days worked, earnings, 
and wages, while equation (13) is the (unobserved) selection process that is driven mostly 
by household characteristics.  In equation (12), the vector Xi contains individual 
characteristics such as the gender of the participant, years of schooling, experience, 
experience squared, height, and the interaction of these variables with the sex of the   29
individual, as defined above.  Potential labor market experience is defined as age minus 
years of schooling minus 14.  The selection equation follows the same specification as 
the participation probits in equation (11). 
 
5. Results from the Off-Farm Income Module 
 
Tables 4, 5, and 6 present marginal effects from probit regressions on the 
probability of participation in wage labor, FFW, and self-employment.  All these 
regressions are based on individuals age 15-65, regardless of their labor market 
participation status.  We present results for two specifications:  one in which the gender 
dummy appears by itself, and another in which it is interacted with individual, household, 
and community characteristics.  
In the specification without interactions, the gender dummy is negative and 
significant in the wage labor and FFW participation equations, but not in self-
employment.  In the specification with interactions, however, the gender dummy is more 
negative, but is no longer statistically significant.  This is probably because, with fewer 
degrees of freedom, the coefficient on the gender dummy is imprecisely estimated.  
Nevertheless, as the joint tests on coefficients show, in the wage labor and FFW 
participation equations, all the interaction terms with gender and all gender terms are 
jointly significant.  This indicates that there are significant differences in men’s and 
women’s participation, with the impact of gender occurring through its interaction with 
individual, household, and community characteristics. 
Life-cycle effects (age and age squared) are strong in the wage labor equation 
(Table 4), and the wage labor market appears to attract taller individuals and better-  30
educated females.  Household livestock holdings reduce participation in wage labor, 
probably owing to a wealth effect and the labor requirements involved in caring for 
livestock, especially for women.  Indeed, livestock holdings have a negative effect on 
women’s participation in wage labor relative to men.  As expected, none of the variables 
capturing the history of food aid received affects participation in wage labor. 
Life-cycle effects are also strong in the FFW equation (Table 5).  Because able-
bodied participants are chosen for FFW, the positive coefficient on height is expected.  
Schooling, however, has mixed effects on FFW participation.  While individuals with 
more schooling are slightly less likely to participate in FFW—possibly due to an element 
of self-targeting—better-educated females are more likely to participate.  The positive 
coefficients of the household head’s schooling and of landownership suggest that FFW 
does not necessarily reach the poorest.  Part of this may be due to impractical guidelines 
and the implementation (and adaptation) of these guidelines in the field.
22 
FFW does perform a consumption-smoothing function.  Since the rainfall and 
disease indices are constructed so that more favorable outcomes are closer to unity, a 
higher value of the index is a positive shock and thus the negative signs on the individual 
rainfall coefficient indicates that individuals are less likely to participate if households 
experience positive rainfall outcomes.  Relative to males, females respond to positive 
rainfall shocks by increasing participation in FFW.  If positive rainfall outcomes increase 
the demand for male agricultural labor on-farm, it is possible that only female labor 
                                                 
22 For example, one of the guidelines is “don't give priority to households owning any livestock asset—i.e., 
prefer those with zero livestock assets,” regardless of other considerations.  This may lead to exclusion of 
families who would be considered poor using other criteria.  A family of three with no livestock is enrolled 
into the program, whereas a family of six with one cow or one goat is excluded.  So inequity in targeting 
outcomes could arise from the impractical guidelines issued by the central government (K. Subbarao, 
personal communication, March 5, 2003).   31
would be available to participate in FFW.  Finally, whether the household received food 
aid in the last three years increases participation, suggesting inertia in food aid receipts. 
With the exception of life cycle effects, very few individual or demographic 
characteristics affect participation in self-employment (Table 6).  Individuals are less 
likely to engage in self-employment activities if community rainfall outcomes are 
positive, possibly owing to the increased demand for agricultural labor, although positive 
household rainfall shocks weakly increase participation in self-employment.  Household 
and individual rainfall shocks also have different effects on women, with positive 
community shocks increasing women’s participation, and positive household outcomes 
reducing it.  Positive community rainfall shocks may increase the demand for women’s 
products (such as crafts, beer, dairy products), while positive household rainfall outcomes 
could exert a negative effect on women’s participation via an income effect. 
As mentioned earlier, gender-related interactions and all gender terms are jointly 
significant in the wage labor and FFW equations, but not in the self-employment 
equation.  Interactions with individual characteristics are significant in wage labor and 
FFW, but not in self-employment.  Assets have gender-differentiated impacts only in the 
wage labor equation, while only the self-employment equation shows that men and 
women respond differently to household and community shocks. 
What may be surprising at first glance is the insignificance of the gender 
interaction with household demographic characteristics.  Studies examining female labor 
supply have pointed to the negative effect that young children have on women’s labor 
force participation in settings as diverse as Guatemala City (Hallman et al. 2003) and 
rural Bangladesh (del Ninno, Wheatley, and Liu 2004), although this effect may be   32
diminished by the provision of child care facilities in public works sites.
23  Young 
children do not appear to have a pronounced negative effect on labor force participation 
in Sub-Saharan Africa, particularly in the agricultural and informal sectors, owing to 
work patterns in which mothers take babies to work, often on their backs, and the 
proximity of the extended family, a source of substitute caregivers.
24  Indeed, an 
evaluation of a large FFW project in Ethiopia found that childcare was not considered a 
problem, since half the respondents left their young children in the charge of older 
children and grandparents, while the remainder did not have children who could not take 
care of themselves (Yeraswork and Solomon 1985, 56). 
Table 7 presents Heckman two-step estimates of the determinants of days worked, 
wages per day, and earnings from wage labor.  Controlling for selection into wage labor, 
females and better educated individuals spend more days in wage labor, but these effects 
are only weakly significant.  Relative to males, taller females spend fewer days in wage 
labor.  In contrast, experience and its square are significant in the wage equation, and 
wages are higher for taller individuals.  Finally, in the earnings equation, better-educated 
and taller individuals earn more from wage labor.  Table 8 presents similar results for 
FFW.  Controlling for selectivity of participation, persons with more experience spend 
fewer days in FFW, while taller persons work more days.  While none of the regressors in 
the wage equation are significant, earnings are higher for better-educated persons. 
                                                 
23 An interesting finding of the Deolalikar and Gaiha (1996) study is that the number of children in the 
household did not have any effect on female participation, possibly because the Maharashtra EGS provided 
on-site crèches.  In contrast, the Trabajar scheme in Argentina did not provide crèches, possibly leading to 
a lower rate of female participation (Jalan and Ravallion 1999). 
24 For evidence showing that young children do not affect women’s labor force participation in Accra, 
Ghana, see Quisumbing, Hallman, and Ruel (2003).   33
Finally, Table 9 shows Heckman two-step estimates for self-employment.  
Controlling for selection, females with more years of schooling spend fewer days on self-
employment activities.  Females, particularly those with more experience, earn higher 
wages per day from self-employment.  While taller individuals earn more per day from 
self-employment, this advantage tends to favor males relative to females.  Finally, after 
controlling for selection, the only consistent determinant of earnings is height, possibly a 
proxy for unobserved characteristics that are correlated with better long-term nutritional 
status. 
Once participation is controlled for, there are very few gender-related 
determinants of days worked, wages, and earnings in both wage labor and FFW.  Thus, 
gender differences in the wage labor market and FFW arise primarily from differences in 
participation.  However, gender differences play a greater role in self-employment. 
 
6. Results from the 1997 Public Works Module and 2003 Program Data 
 
While the above results shed light on differential participation by sex in different 
types of labor markets, they are not particularly informative about the features of public 
works programs that may enhance women’s participation.  To investigate this further, we 
analyze the public works module in the 1997 survey.  While this module cannot be linked 
to earlier rounds, it is more detailed in terms of project information. 
Table 10 presents the characteristics of public works programs in the seven 
villages for which we have program information.  The top panel summarizes information 
from the public works module in the 1997 round, while the bottom panel presents 
information from the key informant interviews conducted in 2003.  Owing to the   34
difficulty of identifying individual projects from the survey data, we present descriptive 
statistics at the village level.
25 
The most common types of public works projects in 1997 were infrastructure and 
soil conservation projects, which were present in 71 percent of the villages.  Social 
services construction projects (building and maintenance of schools and clinics) were 
found in 57 percent of the villages, while 43 percent of the villages had water 
supply/irrigation projects and forestry projects.  Participants had to travel an average of 
3.25 kilometers to the work site. 
Again, because it was difficult to identify individual projects, the information 
presented in the second panel of Table 10 is at the village, not the project, level.  
According to the 2003 interviews, women accounted for about 26 percent of employment 
in public works projects, ranging from 10 to 60 percent of project participants.  Women 
were specifically targeted in 43 percent of the seven villages, but this does not mean that 
women were prioritized in job allocations (only 14 percent of the villages reported that 
women were a priority) and only 14 percent of the villages reported any information 
campaign directed specifically to women.  Crèches were found only in one village, since 
in others, neighbors took care of the children when the mother had to work.  While 
program officials in all villages said that men and women were paid the same for the 
same type of job, women tended to be given lighter work than men. 
Although there was a wide variation in employment duration (from 12.5 days to 
“indefinite”), jobs were rationed in 43 percent of the villages.  This process was deemed 
to be fair in a majority of cases (86 percent), although in one project, it was claimed that 
                                                 
25 That is, we can say that infrastructure projects were present in 71 percent of the villages, but we cannot 
discern the actual number of infrastructure projects.   35
the project officials favored their friends and relatives.  In 70 percent of the villages, 
program officials said that jobs were allocated to those with fewer assets (usually land 
and cattle). 
Finally, it is interesting to note that the imputed average wage per day (computed 
by taking the average of the value of earnings in kind and in cash, divided by workdays) 
from the survey is higher (5.08 birr) compared to the average wage per day in public 
works (3.44 birr) from the village interviews.  The market wage—in the few villages 
where a labor market existed in 1996/97—was 4.13 birr.  Indeed, the 2003 interviews 
suggest that in 25 percent of the villages, public works projects paid higher than the 
market wage.  This confirms the earlier findings of Sharp (1997).  In the vast majority of 
villages (71 percent), wages were paid in kind.
26 
Table 11 presents a descriptive picture of participation and earnings from public 
works, by type of project, of individuals age 15-65.  Similar to the descriptive results 
from the 1994-95 data, men participate more than women in public works—23 percent 
compared to 12 percent.
27  Conditional on participation, however, women work more 
days in public works, at 47 days compared to 30 days, and, with roughly equal wages, 
earn more than men, at 194 birr compared to 155 birr for men.  However, there are 
substantial differences across types of projects. 
                                                 
26 It would have been interesting to test whether women preferred wages in kind.  It has been argued that in 
setting where women are responsible for food provision, and if intrahousehold resource competition exists, 
food could be a more effective mechanism for transferring resources to children, as in some Islamic 
communities in the Greater Horn of Africa (Barrett, Holden, and Clay 2001).  However, there was too little 
variation in the form of wage payments—these were paid in kind in 71 percent of the villages—to obtain 
significant coefficients on this variable. 
27 Possibly due to the longer recall period (12 months versus four months) and more detailed probing of 
participation in public works, reported participation rates are higher than those obtained from the income-
earning activities module.   36
We take a closer look at the three types of projects that account for the greatest 
number of work episodes, infrastructure, soil conservation, and forestry.  While more 
individuals participated in infrastructure projects compared to other types of projects, 
forestry projects generated the most workdays for participants—men worked 52 days in 
forestry projects, and women, 73 days.
28  Wage rates in forestry projects, however, were 
lower than those in infrastructure and soil conservation.  Indeed the minor differences 
between total earnings in these three types of projects suggest that some projects may 
have operated on fewer days, but higher wages, while others (such as forestry projects) 
would have hired individuals for a longer period of time, but with lower wages per day.  
Forestry projects, in particular, often involve a yearlong contract in which individuals are 
asked to plant and care for tree seedlings.  There are relatively few participants in water 
supply and social services projects and those classified in the “other” category. 
Most of the variation in men’s and women’s participation seems to arise from the 
types of projects in place.  Infrastructure employed the largest number of men, but 
relatively fewer women.  Soil conservation projects and forestry projects, on the other 
hand, seem to be relatively “gender fair” in terms of the number of men and women 
employed.  The bias towards males in infrastructure projects and the relative “fairness” of 
soil conservation and forestry projects may be attributable to the types of activities 
undertaken in the projects themselves, as well as individuals’ decision to participate in 
those projects.  Infrastructure projects typically include more strenuous activities such as 
carrying stones and digging ditches, whereas forestry projects involve “lighter” work 
such as watering plants and weeding.  Cultural norms may also affect men’s and 
                                                 
28 The large number of days worked be females in water supply, social services, and other projects is 
probably due to an outlier and should be discounted due to the small cell size.   37
women’s decision to participate in a project.  For example, a previous evaluation found 
that in one catchment area, for example, women did not even participate in a project 
since, in the local culture, the activities done were thought to be “the work of men” 
(Yeraswork and Solomon 1985, 54). 
Soil conservation and forestry projects also operate for longer periods, on 
average, which may allow participants greater flexibility in accomplishing tasks, say 
through piece-rate arrangements.  Such flexible arrangements may be more conducive to 
female participation because of the demands housework puts on their time (Coady 2004).  
Evidence from the key informant interviews suggests that women and men are not 
assigned the same tasks.  Women may also change the terms of wage payment to suit 
their abilities or to accommodate other responsibilities.
29 
Table 12 presents the marginal effects from probit regressions of the determinants 
of participation in public works, estimated using the public works module in the 1997 
round.  These regressions differ from the earlier participation regressions owing to the 
longer recall period and the inclusion of program variables.
30  Similar to the participation 
equations in Table 4, 5, and 6, we present two specifications:  one where the gender 
dummy appears alone, and the other where gender is interacted with individual, 
household, and community characteristics.  Similar to the earlier results for FFW, we find 
                                                 
29 In a public works project in Zambia, for example, women bargained with scheme operators and settled 
for a task-based wage rather than a daily wage.  Thus the wage (rate) for a job of lifting bricks from one 
location to another is fixed through negotiation.  Women can then come and do the job when their children 
are sleeping, allowing them to optimize their time allocation between public works and domestic 
production (K. Subbarao, personal communication, March 5, 2004). 
30 Although we have additional program variables from the key informant interviews, we use those derived 
from the 1997 public works module owing to the strong probability of recall bias in using the 2003 data.  
Moreover, program variables that are viewed to increase an individual women’s participation—such as the 
presence of a crèche or the percentage of women employed in a project—are arguably endogenous to the 
outcomes we are modeling here.  For example, a project with many female participants would be more 
likely to have a crèche, possibly because participants demanded it—and causality would be difficult to 
establish.   38
strong life-cycle effects, and also find that better-educated individuals are less likely to 
work in public works, probably through a self-targeting mechanism.  Individuals are less 
likely to participate in public works if community rainfall outcomes are favorable, 
although they participate more if household rainfall outcomes are positive.  The 
magnitude of the response to household rainfall shock is quite small, however—only 
about a third of the response to the community rainfall shock.  Favorable livestock 
outcomes surprisingly increase women’s likelihood of participation in public works, 
although this result is only weakly significant. 
Unlike the earlier results for FFW, gender interactions with household 
demographic characteristics are jointly significant, though only at the 10 percent level.  
Possibly because we are looking at decisions taken over an entire year, trade-offs 
between public works and domestic work become more important.  To investigate which 
demographic category has the greatest impact on women’s participation, we test for the 
joint significance of the demographic category and its interaction with the female 
dummy.  We reject the null hypothesis that these are jointly insignificant for preschoolers 
(c
2 = 6.37; p = 0.0413) and children 7-15 (c
2 = 9.49; p = 0.0087).  Evidence from the 
field suggests that preschoolers may pose more of a constraint to women’s participation 
in FFW than infants and toddlers (K. Subbarao, personal communication, March 5, 
2004).  However, the influence of children 7-15 may be acting through a different 
pathway.  Since children in this age range could also be undertaking part-time work, 
childcare responsibilities do not seem to be the reason that school-age children make 
female participation in public works less likely.  It is possible that children 7-15   39
substitute for females in off-farm-work, reducing the probability that an individual female 
would need to participate in public works. 
Relative to infrastructure projects (the excluded category), the presence of water, 
social services, and other programs dampen the likelihood of participation, consistent 
with the low participation rates reported in Table 11.  With the exception of the distance 
interaction, individual interactions of program variables with the female dummy are 
insignificant, but gender interactions with program variables are jointly significant.  We 
examine this further in the days worked, wages, and earnings and regressions (Table 13). 
Table 13 presents Heckman two-step estimates of days worked, wages per day, 
and earnings from public works in 1997.  Schooling does not affect days worked in 
public works, but females with more labor market experience spend fewer days in public 
works relative to males with more experience.  The most interesting result from this table, 
however, is the significance of the program variables and the significance of their joint 
interactions with gender.  The participation results showed that the presence of water, 
social services, and other projects in the village reduced the probability of participation.  
Conditional on participation, however, days worked in water, social services, and other 
projects are slightly higher, but wages are lower, leading to an insignificant net effect on 
earnings.  The presence of forestry projects, which have longer durations of employment, 
reduces wages and thus does not significantly affect earnings.  The presence of soil 
conservation projects increases wages, but does not significantly increase earnings owing 
to the negative (though statistically insignificant) effect on days worked.  It is possible 
that project managers may choose to optimize project budgets by either maximizing 
employment at lower wages, or offering fewer positions, but at higher wages.    40
Government projects, however, both offer more days worked and higher wages, thus 
having significant positive effects on earnings.  Distance to the site also reduces both the 
number of days worked and earnings.  Thus, similar to the results using the 1994-95 data, 
gender differences are strongest in the participation equation. 
To better understand the employment process in public works—from application 
to actual work—we turn to the participants’ and nonparticipants’ own views (Table 14).  
Our first observation is that very few individuals apply for a job—23 percent of men, and 
14 percent of women.  The three main reasons for men’s not applying are the need to 
work on the farm (33 percent), the fact (or perception thereof) that no jobs were being 
offered (14.4 percent) and the perception that there was no chance of being hired (12.5 
percent).  For women, the biggest hurdles to application were conflicts with childcare and 
other responsibilities (26.7 percent), being too young or too old (16.5 percent), and no 
jobs being offered (14 percent).
31  Non-application appears to be the biggest barrier to 
participation, since 80 percent of men and 75 percent of women who applied were 
eventually hired.  For both men and women, a scarcity of jobs was the main reason for 
rejection, accounting for 60 percent of male and 64 percent of female responses.  Being 
“richer” only accounted for 5 to 6 percent of rejections, which may indicate the non-
application of means-based targeting criteria.  However, most of the individuals 
eventually found work in another program. 
                                                 
31 Low participation rates can also be explained by the manner in which public works projects are 
implemented.  Almost the entire activity is funded using donated food, which arrives at the Djibouti port (at 
a landed cost of $152 per ton).  It then takes months to reach locations even as close as 100 miles -- and the 
unit cost per ton goes up to $350 per ton, owing to the poor transport network and the high costs of 
transporting grain.   Thus, grain arrives for public works at a time when even very poor farmers are busy on 
their own farms.  The program fails because it does not operate at a time when the opportunity cost of labor 
is lowest – rather, the scheme is floated when the opportunity cost of labor is highest, so the takers for the 
program are so few.   As a result the program also fails to perform its consumption smoothing function 
(Smith and Subbarao 2003; K.Subbarao, personal communication, March 5, 2003).   41
Among those women who did not find work in another program, illness was the 
major reason for not finding work (33 percent), followed by the perception that there was 
no chance of being hired (26.7 percent).  For men, the perception that they had no chance 
of being hired was the major reason accounted for 28.6 percent, and illness, 21.4 percent.  
The prevalence of illness as a reason for not finding work is cause for concern, given the 
high burden of disease and the low levels of public health spending in this low-income 
economy.
32  Finally, 91 percent of those who did not find work would have wanted to 
work more.  Most (80 percent for men, 60 percent for women) were unable to because the 
project ended.  Clearly, lack of job openings, the need to ration jobs, and perceptions of 
the low probability of being hired affect both men and women.  Childcare 
responsibilities—for the preschool age group—affect women more than men, and thus 
may be an important consideration in determining women’s sustained participation in 
public works programs.  Given the increasing evidence that preschool programs can 
improve future schooling outcomes (see the volume edited by Young 2002), combining 
early childhood development programs (social and cognitive stimulation, nutrition 
services) with child care for working mothers may relieve constraints for women’s 
participation in public works as well as lay the foundation for entry into primary school. 
 
7. Conclusions and Policy Implications 
 
Our preliminary results suggest that FFW in Ethiopia operates in a similar fashion 
to other labor markets, in which female participation is low.  In regressions using data 
                                                 
32 The highest level of per capita health spending ever recorded in Ethiopia as of 1997, when the survey 
took place, was US$4.  Preventive care received only 16 percent of total health expenditure.  At a level of 
$4, this translates to no more than US$0.50 spent on a package of basic health services including 
immunization, protected water supply, sanitation, and food supplementation, from government, donor, and 
NGO sources (Subbarao and Mehra 1997).   42
from 1994-95, and those using the 1997 data, gender differences are most evident in the 
decision to participate.  However, the results from the 1994-95 data show that different 
factors resulting in differential female participation may be operating in different types of 
labor markets.  In the wage labor market, interactions of gender with individual 
characteristics such as schooling, and with household asset positions (especially 
livestock) are important.  Better educated women are more likely to participate in the 
wage labor market, while higher livestock holdings diminish participation more for 
women, owing to women’s important role in dairy production.  Females with more 
schooling are also more likely to participate in FFW.  However, men and women’s 
participation in FFW and self-employment does not respond in the same way to 
household and community shocks. 
Controlling for selection, however, it is difficult to ascertain the presence of a 
gender disadvantage in the wage labor market and FFW, since most of the gender 
interactions are jointly insignificant.  Only in self-employment do women earn higher 
wages per day, although there is no significant positive effect of being female on 
earnings.  The most consistent results from both the 1994-95 data are the positive 
earnings effects of schooling and height in both in wage labor and FFW, conditional on 
participation.  This suggests that even in the low-skill labor markets of rural Ethiopia, 
there are returns to investments in human capital. 
We obtain additional information from regressions with program variables using 
the 1997 data.  These variables are highly significant determinants of participation, and 
affect men and women’s participation in different ways.  The descriptive results show 
that the type of project is to a large part responsible for the variation in participation, days   43
worked, wages, and earnings.  These differences arise from the type of activities inherent 
in these projects as well as project managers’ discretion to optimize days worked or 
wages per day, given a fixed budget.  The regression results show that relative to 
infrastructure projects, water, social services, and other projects decrease participation 
probabilities.  Government projects increase participation probabilities, wages, days 
worked, and earnings, conditional on participation.  Distance has a strong negative effect 
on women’s participation relative to males. 
Is workfare thus gender fair?  The pattern of earnings differentials in FFW and 
public works programs does not seem to be very different from those in the labor market, 
where most of the differential is attributable to differences in returns.  FFW in Ethiopia 
does not appear to be more “fair” than the wage labor market in general, despite 
directives to target women or to ensure women’s control of the food entitlement in FFW 
operations.  It is perhaps unrealistic to expect that public works will have a different work 
culture than the wage labor market in general, except perhaps for rare cases where 
affirmative action is actively pursued. 
Given the low levels of women’s participation in public works in Ethiopia, the 
binding constraint of the limited number of jobs, and cultural norms that may affect 
sorting into activities—is public works the most effective way of reaching women?  WFP 
has already begun to rethink the importance of FFW as a way of enhancing women’s 
involvement (WFP 2003b).  If women are excluded from decisions regarding the creation 
and management of assets, their share of the benefits may be lower than men’s.  While 
increasing women’s involvement in decisionmaking is more difficult to monitor than 
counting the number of male and female workers, the latter may be better able to ensure   44
that they will benefit from the assets created.  Increasing participation may also improve 
project performance, as an evaluation of 101 public works programs in South Africa 
suggests.  Even after accounting for the endogeneity of participation, de facto 
participation led to project outcomes that were more cost-efficient, generated increased 
direct benefits to the community, and with greater gender impact (Adato, Hoddinott, and 
Haddad 2003). 
At the same time, guaranteeing wage equality with men may not satisfy women’s 
other objectives.  Female workers may be more likely to share earned rations with family 
members, especially their children, and, combined with more strenuous activities, this 
practice may lead to a deterioration of the female worker’s own nutritional status (Barrett, 
Holden, and Clay 2001).  Thus, FFW activities should also take into account women’s 
physical capacities, the need to maintain their own nutritional status, and be designed in a 
way that facilitates their work participation.  Flexible scheduling and provision of crèches 
will often be required to allow women who perform many tasks within the household to 
participate, especially for widows and single mothers, and mothers of young children 
(WFP 2003b).  Providing crèches-cum-ECD programs may help relieve childcare 
constraints for mothers who participate in public works, while taking advantage of a 
window of opportunity to invest in the next generation (Hoddinott and Quisumbing 
2003). 
A more radical departure from traditional food assistance is the new emphasis on 
food for training (FFT).  FFT programs aim to build human assets, and provide incentives 
for women to participate in training programs on income-generating skills, nutrition and 
health education, and life skills training (functional literacy and numeracy, leadership   45
skills and political and social awareness).  Indeed, our analysis of participation and 
earnings show consistently high returns to human capital, whether to long-term 
nutritional status (height) or schooling.  FFT programs that increase women’s stock of 
human capital may yield higher returns for women in the long run than the unskilled 
work typical of FFW.   46
Table 1.  Participation and earnings in wage labor, food-for-work, and self-employment in the past 4 months, by sex 
All monetary variables in 1997 birr                 
Individuals 15-65, villages with food-for-work projects in that specific round             
   Survey round  All rounds 
   1994a  1994b  1995       
  Males  Females  Males  Females  Males  Females  Males  Females 
Number of observations   409 415 454 472 605 614 1923 1965
Participation rates                 
  Wage labor  0.11 0.02 0.11 0.02 0.08 0.01 0.09 0.02
  Food-for-work  0.18 0.07 0.16 0.06 0.14 0.07 0.13 0.05
  Self-employment  0.08 0.12 0.09 0.10 0.06 0.09 0.07 0.08
  All off-farm labor  0.35 0.21 0.32 0.16 0.26 0.16 0.26 0.14
Days worked in each activity, for participants only                 
  Wage labor  36.26 28.44 44.90 48.75 34.53 44.63 40.89 43.10
  Food-for-work  37.16 35.80 48.73 36.04 51.00 52.00 33.94 29.75
  Self-employment  59.19 37.77 46.00 43.35 39.82 49.85 46.38 43.67
  Total days worked off farm  44.44 36.55 52.35 44.28 30.14 39.18 42.75 40.30
Imputed wages per day, for those reporting wages only               
  Wage labor  4.21 2.45 5.84 1.14 7.22 2.39 6.36 2.45
  Food-for-work  3.05 3.27 2.81 3.89 3.97 3.23 3.30 3.32
  Self-employment  6.55 2.15 11.21 2.02 17.24 3.39 12.55 2.65
  Wages in off-farm-work, all activities  4.00 2.58 6.05 2.53 7.45 3.11 6.27 2.82
Earnings, for those reporting positive earnings                 
  Wage labor  127.85 53.14 329.92 108.70 261.40 86.29 275.27 101.89
  Food-for-work  121.40 122.26 98.93 106.77 76.01 65.22 98.40 94.30
  Self-employment  292.10 90.16 179.79 71.01 255.57 176.97 274.76 117.07
  All off-farm-work  174.03 97.88 205.44 89.02 191.61 138.21 218.55 111.95
                 
Number of villages with public works, by round  5  7  8     
Number of villages with valid data (a)  5   5   7        
Source:  Rounds 1-3, Ethiopian Rural Household Survey, off-farm income and business activities module       
Note:  Numbers reported in all rounds are averages taken over all individuals in all rounds, not weighted  averages of the round-specific means. 
(a)  The incidence of public works in two villages, Dinki and Shumshaha, was very low, possibly reflecting data quality.  We do not include 
these villages in the descriptive tables or regressions.                 47
Table 2.  Distribution of public works programs and work episodes by village, 1997 
Village  Type of program  Allocated work episodes  Total work episodes by village 
Haresaw  REST      32     70 
  World Vision      31   
  FFW      7   
Geblen  Irish School 'DonBosco'      21     25 
  FAO/Mi n Agr/PA      4   
Dinki  Government      20     20 
Yetemen  none      0      0 
Shumshaha  Government      5      5 
Sirbana Godeti  none      0      0 
Adele Keke  Government      1      1 
Korodega  Government      131     137 
  FFW       6   
Tirufe Kechema  none      0      0 
Imdibir  FFW       42      42 
Aze Deboa  none      0      0 
Adado  none      0      0 
Gara Godo  Govt/NGO/PA      10      43 
  FFW       28   
  NGO      5   
Domaa  1. Govt/PA      11      12 
  2. FFW       1   
Debre Berhan  Peasant Association      2      2 
Total        357     357 
Source:  Krishnan 2003. 
Note:  Entries in bold indicate villages for which program information was collected.   48
Table 3.  Means and standard deviations of variables used in regressions 
Variable        Mean 
Standard  
deviation 
Percent participating in:         
  Wage labor      0.05  0.23 
  Food for work      0.09  0.28 
  Self-employment      0.07  0.26 
  All off-farm-work      0.20  0.40 
Days spent in         
  Wage labor       2.22  12.72 
  Food for work      2.89  11.46 
  Self-employment      3.28  14.78 
  All off-farm-work      8.39  22.11 
Imputed wages in         
  Wage labor       5.73  8.18 
  Food for work      3.31  3.08 
  Self-employment      7.29  23.03 
  Off-farm-work      5.05  13.97 
Earnings from         
  Wage labor       12.83  110.09 
  Food for work      8.07  38.96 
  Self-employment      14.33  116.03 
  Off-farm-work      35.23  165.97 
Individual characteristics         
  Sex (1 if female)      0.51  0.50 
  Age in years      32.86  13.51 
  Experience      17.36  13.69 
  Highest grade attained      1.71  1.38 
  Height in cm      159.92  10.05 
Household characteristics         
  Age of household head      45.27  11.31 
  Education of household head      1.68  1.55 
  Whether household is female-headed      0.06  0.23 
  Log of household size      1.99  0.47 
Proportion in demographic categories (males 15-65 is excluded category) 
  Children 0-3      0.08  0.10 
  Children 3-7      0.11  0.11 
  Children 7-15      0.20  0.15 
  Females 15-65      0.29  0.14 
  Over 65      0.03  0.07 
Assets         
  Land in Round 1 (hectares)      0.79  0.72 
  Value of livestock in Round 1 (1997 birr)      1,297.12  1481.97 
Community shocks         
  Community rainfall index (1 is best, leave-out mean)    0.67  0.20 
Household shocks (1 is best)         
  Rainfall index      0.67  0.34 
  Livestock index      0.83  0.24 
History of aid received         
  Kilograms of wheat received in 1983-84 famine      23.83  65.91 
  Kilograms of wheat received in 1991-93      120.47  366.21 
  Whether received other aid in 1983-84 famine      0.37  0.48 
  Whether received other aid in 1991-93        0.48  0.50 
Source:  Rounds 1-3, Ethiopian Rural Household Survey.   49
Table 4.  Determinants of participation in wage labor, with and without gender 
interactions, individuals 15-65 
Villages with public works in specific round, Rounds 1-3 
Probit estimates with robust standard errors, marginal effects reported 
  Without interactions    With interactions 
  dF/dX  z    dF/dX  z 
Individual characteristics           
  Sex (1 = female)  -0.051  -5.10    -0.082  -0.53 
  Age in years  0.004  2.46    0.003  2.07 
  Age in years squared  0.000  -2.17    0.000  -1.86 
  Highest grade attained  0.003  0.89    -0.001  -0.43 
  Height  0.001  1.85    0.001  1.73 
Sex x individual characteristics           
  Age x female        0.000  0.06 
  Age2 x female        0.000  0.04 
  Education x female        0.011  2.81 
  Height x female        0.000  -0.11 
Household characteristics           
  Age of household head  0.000  -0.37    0.000  -0.38 
  Education of household head  -0.006  -1.44    -0.002  -1.04 
  Female-headed households  -0.013  -1.02    -0.009  -0.94 
Household demographics           
  Ln of household size  -0.008  -0.67    -0.010  -1.09 
  Children 0-3 (ratio)  -0.023  -0.54    -0.014  -0.42 
  Children 3-7 (ratio)  0.055  1.48    0.034  1.10 
  Children 7-15 (ratio)  0.048  1.44    0.027  0.97 
  Females 15-65 (ratio)  0.003  0.08    -0.002  -0.06 
  Over 65 (ratio)  0.111  1.86    0.057  1.16 
Sex x household demographics           
  Ln household size x female        0.021  1.55 
  Children 0-3 x female        -0.060  -0.78 
  Children 3-7 x female        0.048  0.87 
  Children 7-15 x female        0.026  0.65 
  Females 15-65 x female        0.010  0.19 
  Over 65 x female        0.133  1.27 
Assets           
  Land in hectares (Round 1)  0.005  0.85    0.005  1.09 
  Value of livestock in Round 1 (1997 birr)  0.000  -2.29    0.000  -1.75 
Sex x assets           
  Land in Round 1 x female        -0.007  -0.95 
  Livestock in Round 1 x female        0.000  -2.17 
Community shocks           
  Community rainfall index (1 is best, leave-out mean)  0.056  0.92    0.035  0.78 
Household shocks (1 is best)           
  Rainfall index  0.008  0.68    0.009  0.93 
  Livestock index  -0.013  -1.19    -0.007  -0.76 
Sex x community shocks           
  Community rainfall index x female        -0.005  -0.12 
Sex x household shocks           
  Rainfall index x female        -0.008  -0.36 
  Livestock index x female        -0.022  -1.04 
History of shocks and aid received           
  Kilograms of wheat received in 1983-84 famine  0.000  1.53    0.000  1.60 
  Kilograms of wheat received in 1991-93  0.000  0.24    0.000  0.24 
  Whether received other aid in 1983-84 famine  0.015  1.08    0.013  1.19 
  Whether received other aid in 1991-93  -0.009  -0.72    -0.008  -0.91 
F-test on interaction terms (p-values)           
  Sex x individual characteristics=0        8.38  0.08 
  Sex x household demographics=0        7.31  0.29 
  Sex x assets=0        8.54  0.01 
  Sex x community shocks=0        0.01  0.91 
  Sex x household shocks=0        1.50  0.47 
  All interactions=0        39.64  0.00 
  All gender terms=0        61.83  0.00 
Observed probability  0.06      0.06   
Predicted probability  0.02      0.02   
Number of observations  1,837      1,837   
Wald test (Chi-square)  185.71      258.61   
Prob > chi2    0.00      0.00   
Pseudo R2      0.2359      0.26   
Notes:  Regressions included round and village dummies, which are not reported here.  z-statistics in bold are significant 
at 10 percent or better.   50
Table 5.  Determinants of participation in food for work, with and without gender 
interactions, individuals 15-65 
Villages with public works in specific round, Rounds 1-3 
Probit estimates with robust standard errors, marginal effects reported 
  Without interactions    With interactions 
  dF/dX  z    dF/dX  z 
Individual characteristics           
  Sex (1 = female)  -0.092  -5.66    -0.195  -0.72 
  Age in years  0.006  2.04    0.010  2.66 
  Age in years squared  0.000  -2.01    0.000  -2.51 
  Highest grade attained  -0.005  -0.82    -0.009  -1.65 
  Height  0.003  3.30    0.002  2.23 
Sex x individual characteristics           
  Age x female        -0.001  -0.21 
  Age2 x female        0.000  -0.03 
  Education x female        0.018  2.44 
  Height x female        0.001  0.49 
Household characteristics           
  Age of household head  0.000  0.19    0.000  0.29 
  Education of household head  0.005  1.17    0.008  1.81 
  Female-headed households  0.058  1.88    0.049  1.66 
Household demographics           
  Ln of household size  -0.029  -1.52    -0.012  -0.56 
  Children 0-3 (ratio)  0.034  0.46    0.009  0.11 
  Children 3-7 (ratio)  0.091  1.44    0.033  0.44 
  Children 7-15 (ratio)  0.047  0.78    0.016  0.25 
  Females 15-65 (ratio)  0.060  0.98    0.005  0.07 
  Over 65 (ratio)  -0.010  -0.08    -0.085  -0.61 
Sex x household demographics           
  Ln household size x female        -0.015  -0.53 
  Children 0-3 x female        -0.047  -0.38 
  Children 3-7 x female        0.055  0.49 
  Children 7-15 x female        -0.016  -0.15 
  Females 15-65 x female        0.056  0.50 
  Over 65 x female        0.160  0.60 
Assets           
  Land in hectares (Round 1)  0.014  1.35    0.023  1.95 
  Value of livestock in Round 1 (1997 birr)  0.000  -1.57    0.000  -1.38 
Sex x assets           
  Land in Round 1 x female        -0.024  -1.57 
  Livestock in Round 1 x female        0.000  -0.50 
Community shocks           
  Community rainfall index (1 is best, leave-out mean)  -0.022  -0.25    -0.024  -0.27 
Household shocks (1 is best)           
  Rainfall index  -0.036  -1.93    -0.055  -2.27 
  Livestock index  -0.028  -1.05    -0.026  -0.88 
Sex x community shocks           
  Community rainfall index x female        0.015  0.19 
Sex x household shocks           
  Rainfall index x female        0.070  1.86 
  Livestock index x female        -0.014  -0.29 
History of shocks and aid received           
  Kilograms of wheat received in 1983-84 famine  0.000  -0.80    0.000  -0.77 
  Kilograms of wheat received in 1991-93  0.000  0.84    0.000  0.87 
  Whether received other aid in 1983-84 famine  -0.026  -1.38    -0.027  -1.54 
  Whether received other aid in 1991-93  0.037  2.31    0.036  2.30 
F-test on interaction terms (p-values)           
  Sex x individual characteristics=0        14.95  0.00 
  Sex x household demographics=0        1.87  0.93 
  Sex x assets=0        2.83  0.24 
  Sex x community shocks=0        0.04  0.85 
  Sex x household shocks=0        3.47  0.18 
  All interactions=0        25.85  0.04 
  All gender terms=0        66.90  0.00 
Observed probability  0.13      0.13   
Predicted probability  0.07      0.07   
Number of observations  1,837      1,837   
Wald test (Chi-square)  287.76      323.23   
Prob > chi2    0.00      0.00   
Pseudo R2      0.22      0.23   
Notes:  Regressions included round and village dummies, which are not reported here.  z-statistics in bold are significant 
at 10 percent or better.   51
Table 6.  Determinants of participation in self-employment, with and without 
gender interactions, individuals 15-65 
Villages with public works in specific round, Rounds 1-3 
Probit estimates with robust standard errors, marginal effects reported 
  Without interactions    With interactions 
  dF/dX  z    dF/dX  z 
Individual characteristics           
  Sex (1 = female)  -0.001  -0.04    -0.131  -0.57 
  Age in years  0.008  2.28    0.008  2.00 
  Age in years squared  0.000  -2.44    0.000  -2.24 
  Highest grade attained  -0.017  -2.30    -0.012  -1.42 
  Height  0.001  1.23    0.000  0.65 
Sex x individual characteristics           
  Age x female        -0.002  -0.28 
  Age2 x female        0.000  0.35 
  Education x female        -0.017  -1.16 
  Height x female        0.001  0.42 
Household characteristics           
  Age of household head  0.000  0.02    0.000  -0.16 
  Education of household head  -0.003  -0.51    -0.003  -0.70 
  Female-headed households  -0.001  -0.05    -0.006  -0.24 
Household demographics           
  Ln of household size  -0.017  -1.02    -0.021  -0.95 
  Children 0-3 (ratio)  -0.038  -0.57    -0.021  -0.24 
  Children 3-7 (ratio)  -0.012  -0.24    0.016  0.22 
  Children 7-15 (ratio)  -0.011  -0.22    -0.010  -0.15 
  Females 15-65 (ratio)  -0.028  -0.56    -0.094  -1.23 
  Over 65 (ratio)  -0.075  -0.69    -0.277  -1.37 
Sex x household demographics           
  Ln household size x female        0.008  0.27 
  Children 0-3 x female        -0.002  -0.02 
  Children 3-7 x female        -0.047  -0.46 
  Children 7-15 x female        0.019  0.24 
  Females 15-65 x female        0.123  1.22 
  Over 65 x female        0.414  1.53 
Assets           
  Land in hectares (Round 1)  0.011  1.17    0.015  1.46 
  Value of livestock in Round 1 (1997 birr)  0.000  -0.75    0.000  0.18 
Sex x assets           
  Land in Round 1 x female        -0.011  -0.65 
  Livestock in Round 1 x female        0.000  -1.13 
Community shocks           
  Community rainfall index (1 is best, leave-out mean)  -0.267  -3.52    -0.332  -4.56 
Household shocks (1 is best)           
  Rainfall index  -0.003  -0.18    0.032  1.73 
  Livestock index  0.027  1.49    0.032  1.16 
Sex x community shocks           
  Community rainfall index x female        0.132  2.12 
Sex x household shocks           
  Rainfall index x female        -0.069  -2.65 
  Livestock index x female        -0.007  -0.20 
History of shocks and aid received           
  Kilograms of wheat received in 1983-84 famine  0.000  -0.84    0.000  -0.73 
  Kilograms of wheat received in 1991-93  0.000  -2.29    0.000  -2.30 
  Whether received other aid in 1983-84 famine  0.025  1.36    0.024  1.42 
  Whether received other aid in 1991-93  0.006  0.36    0.004  0.25 
F-test on interaction terms (p-values)           
  Sex x individual characteristics=0        2.25  0.69 
  Sex x household demographics=0        5.08  0.53 
  Sex x assets=0        2.37  0.31 
  Sex x community shocks=0        4.51  0.03 
  Sex x household shocks=0        7.51  0.02 
  All interactions=0        19.00  0.21 
  All gender terms=0        19.16  0.26 
Observed probability  0.09      0.09   
Predicted probability  0.05      0.04   
Number of observations  1,837      1,837   
Wald test (Chi-square)  202.65      269.43   
Prob > chi2    0.00      0.00   
Pseudo R2      0.19      0.21   
Notes:  Regressions included round and village dummies, which are not reported here.  z-statistics in bold are significant 
at 10 percent or better.   52
Table 7.  Determinants of days worked, wage per day, and earnings from wage 
labor, Heckman two-step estimates, individuals 15-65 
Selection equation as specified in Table 4 
  Days worked    Wage per day    Earnings 
 
Earnings 
coefficient  z   
Earnings 
coefficient  z   
Earnings 
coefficient  z 
Individual characteristics                 
  Sex (1 = female)  382.704  1.83    40.918  0.78    909.774  0.69 
  Years of schooling  5.626  1.81    0.180  0.23    49.980  2.64 
  Experience  -0.090  -0.06    0.792  2.05    13.856  1.86 
  Experience squared  0.006  0.20    -0.014  -1.76    -0.202  -1.17 
  Height  0.392  0.70    0.378  2.67    5.388  1.79 
Sex x individual characteristics                 
  Years of schooling x female  1.826  0.25    0.488  0.26    -23.610  -0.48 
  Experience x female  -4.101  -1.09    -0.272  -0.29    -1.245  -0.05 
  Experience squared x female  0.074  0.86    0.004  0.18    -0.037  -0.08 
  Height x female  -2.745  -1.66    -0.261  -0.80    -5.698  -0.72 
  Constant  -76.790  -0.69    -81.055  -2.90    -1,465.894  -2.15 
  Lambda  2.745  0.19    5.171  1.39    107.350  1.21 
                 
Number of observations  1,837      1,837      1,837   
Censored observations  1,718      1,718      1,546   
Uncensored observations  119      119      291   
                 
Wald chi2(92)  73.11      58.1      102.12   
Prob > chi2  0.00      0.00      0.00   
Notes:  Regressions included round and village dummies, which are not reported here.  z-statistics in bold 
are significant at 10 percent or better.   53
Table 8.  Determinants of days worked, wage per day, and earnings from food for 
work, Heckman two-step estimates, individuals 15-65 
Selection equation as specified in Table 5 
  Days worked    Wage per day    Earnings 
  Coefficient  z    Coefficient  z    Coefficient  z 
Individual characteristics                 
  Sex (1 = female)  -56.358  -1.01    -1.455  -0.14    -304.309  -0.94 
  Years of schooling  0.174  0.22    0.216  1.40    8.514  1.82 
  Experience  -0.879  -2.28    0.088  1.18    1.090  0.49 
  Experience squared  0.016  2.09    -0.002  -1.11    -0.022  -0.49 
  Height  0.316  1.68    -0.025  -0.69    -0.352  -0.32 
Sex x individual characteristics                 
  Years of schooling x female  -2.523  -1.10    0.001  0.00    -7.805  -0.58 
  Experience x female  -0.031  -0.04    -0.032  -0.23    -2.270  -0.53 
  Experience squared x female  0.006  0.30    0.000  -0.04    0.041  0.33 
  Height x female  0.360  1.00    0.012  0.17    2.052  0.98 
  Constant  -10.510  -0.31    7.626  1.18    177.693  0.91 
  Lambda  2.170  0.39    -0.947  -0.87    -14.588  -0.44 
                 
Number of observations  1,837      1,837      1,837   
Censored observations  1,594      1,594      1,593   
Uncensored observations  243      243      244   
                 
Wald chi2(92)  386.64      164.92      152.05   
Prob > chi2  0.00      0.00      0.00   
Notes:  Regressions included round and village dummies, which are not reported here.  z-statistics in bold 
are significant at 10 percent or better.   54
Table 9.  Determinants of days worked, wage per day, and earnings from self-
employment, Heckman two-step estimates, individuals 15-65 
Selection equation as specified in Table 6 
  Days worked    Wage per day    Earnings 
  Coefficient  z    Coefficient  z    Coefficient  z 
Individual characteristics                 
  Sex (1 = female)  -131.301  -1.07    162.971  2.80    845.509  0.96 
  Years of schooling  3.610  1.03    0.201  0.12    19.302  0.77 
  Experience  1.543  1.10    -1.729  -2.57    7.822  0.77 
  Experience squared  -0.056  -1.73    0.031  2.03    -0.279  -1.19 
  Height  -0.420  -0.74    1.035  3.76    9.711  2.36 
Sex x individual characteristics                 
  Years of schooling x female  -17.438  -1.95    0.492  0.12    -94.864  -1.47 
  Experience x female  -0.497  -0.30    1.579  2.01    -0.285  -0.02 
  Experience squared x female  0.032  0.86    -0.028  -1.61    0.114  0.43 
  Height x female  0.874  1.12    -0.125  -3.05    -5.122  -0.92 
  Constant  33.644  0.35    -89.532  -1.91    -1,757.061  -2.49 
  Lambda  30.409  2.43    -7.191  -1.22    166.542  1.86 
                 
Number of observations  1,837      1,837      1,837   
Censored observations  1,664      1,664      1,662   
Uncensored observations  173      173      175   
                 
Wald chi2(92)  111.29      135.43      125.31   
Prob > chi2  0.00      0.00      0.00   
Notes:  Regressions included round and village dummies, which are not reported here.  z-statistics in bold 
are significant at 10 percent or better.   55
Table 10.  Characteristics of public works programs, 1997, village averages 
  N  Mean 
Standard 
deviation 
Information from public works module (1997 household survey)       
  Proportion with infrastructure projects  7  0.71  0.45 
  Proportion with forestry projects  7  0.43  0.49 
  Proportion with soil conservation projects  7  0.71  0.45 
  Proportion with water supply or irrigation projects  7  0.43  0.49 
  Proportion with social services projects  7  0.57  0.49 
  Average distance to public works site (kilometers)  7  3.25  2.81 
       
Information from key informant interviews (2003)       
  Number of employees  7  449.64  516.71 
  Employment duration  7  149.64  160.51 
  Market wage (if labor market exists)  7  4.13  0.63 
  Wage per day in public works  4  3.44  2.47 
  Proportion of villages paying wages in kind  7  0.71  0.45 
  Proportion of villages where projects paid higher than the market wage, if 
the latter exists  4  0.57  0.49 
  Proportion of villages with government projects  7  0.57  0.49 
  Proportion of villages allocating jobs based on assets (fewer assets 
preferred)  7  0.71  0.45 
  Percentage of women  7  26.00  19.44 
  Proportion of villages giving priority to women in job allocations  7  0.14  0.35 
  Proportion of villages where jobs were rationed  7  0.43  0.49 
  Proportion reporting that job allocation was fair  7  0.86  0.35 
  Proportion of villages in which women participated in public works  7  1.00  0.00 
  Proportion of villages with crèches  7  0.14  0.35 
  Proportion of villages targeting women  7  0.43  0.49 
  Proportion of villages where women were specially informed  7  0.14  0.35 
  Proportion of villages where men and women were paid the same wage  7  1.00  0.00 
  Proportion of villages where men and women had the same jobs  7  0.57  0.49 
Note:  See details in text.   56
Table 11.  Participation and earnings from public works, and characteristics of 
public works programs, Round 4 
Seven villages with specific program information 
All monetary variables in 1997 birr 
  Male    Female 
Variable  N  Mean 
Standard 
deviation    N  Mean 
Standard 
deviation 
Overall  801        868     
               
Number of participants (a)  203        121     
Proportion participating in public works, last 12 months    0.23  0.37      0.12  0.31 
Days worked in public works, last 12 months, 
participants only  165  30.18  43.14    91  46.82  68.20 
Earnings per day from public works, last 12 months, 
participants only  142  9.73  11.74    75  75.00  11.80 
Earnings from public works, last 12 months, 
participants only  203  155.47  174.84    121  169.76  184.30 
Infrastructure projects               
  Number of participants (a)  94        39     
  Proportion participating in infrastructure projects    0.12  0.30      0.04  0.20 
  Days worked in public works, last 12 months, 
participants only  94  20.61  15.98    37  13.78  6.55 
  Earnings per day from public works, last 12 months, 
participants only  75  14.91  13.51    32  17.88  14.37 
  Earnings from public works, last 12 months, 
participants only  93  196.89  95.33    39  197.73  88.02 
Soil conservation projects               
  Number of participants (a)  31        36     
  Proportion participating in soil conservation projects    0.04  0.19      0.04  0.20 
  Days worked in public works, last 12 months, 
participants only  30  34.87  46.88    34  49.79  61.19 
  Earnings per day from public works, last 12 months, 
participants only  28  16.63  61.48    33  4.46  4.14 
  Earnings from public works, last 12 months, 
participants only  31  155.33  117.36    36  148.97  133.68 
Forestry projects               
  Number of participants (a)  17        19     
  Proportion participating in forestry projects    0.02  0.14      0.02  0.14 
  Days worked in public works, last 12 months, 
participants only  11  52.36  103.37    10  72.70  104.39 
  Earnings per day from public works, last 12 months, 
participants only  11  3.94  1.09    10  4.07  1.40 
  Earnings from public works, last 12 months, 
participants only  17  142.28  244.55    19  229.25  242.11 
Water supply, social services, and other projects               
  Number of participants (a)  25        7     
  Proportion participating in water supply, social 
services, and other projects    0.03  0.17      0.01  0.09 
  Days worked in public works, last 12 months, 
participants only  25  42.60  53.35    6  176.00  85.08 
  Earnings per day from public works, last 12 months, 
participants only  22  6.29  6.49    6  2.06  1.93 
  Earnings from public works, last 12 months, 
participants only  23  146.38  155.25    7  303.73  441.96 
Note:  Individuals age 15-65, with complete information on individual and household characteristics. 
(a) Number of participants is based on the number of individuals reporting days worked or earnings, 
whichever is larger.   57
Table 12.  Determinants of participation in public works, 1997, individuals 15-65 
Probit estimates with robust standard errors, marginal effects reported 
  Without interactions    With interactions 
  dF/dX  z    dF/dX  z 
Individual characteristics           
  Sex (1 = female)  -0.086  -2.35    -0.557  -0.75 
  Age in years  0.013  1.67    0.025  2.60 
  Age in years squared  0.000  -1.71    0.000  -2.55 
  Highest grade attained  -0.024  -2.71    -0.023  -2.61 
  Height  0.005  2.36    0.002  0.95 
Sex x individual characteristics           
  Age x female        -0.023  -1.56 
  Age2 x female        0.000  1.32 
  Education x female        -0.008  -0.46 
  Height x female        0.005  1.41 
Household characteristics           
  Female-headed households  0.025  0.43    0.029  0.53 
Household demographics           
  Ln of household size  0.000  0.00    0.007  0.17 
  Children 0-3 (ratio)  0.024  0.12    -0.053  -0.24 
  Children 3-7 (ratio)  0.374  2.38    0.408  2.43 
  Children 7-15 (ratio)  0.168  1.15    0.348  2.48 
  Females 15-65 (ratio)  0.046  0.32    0.173  1.19 
  Over 65 (ratio)  0.414  1.39    0.325  0.83 
Sex x household demographics           
  Ln household size x female        -0.006  -0.09 
  Children 0-3 x female        0.053  0.16 
  Children 3-7 x female        -0.262  -1.19 
  Children 7-15 x female        -0.536  -2.68 
  Females 15-65 x female        -0.421  -2.01 
  Over 65 x female        0.109  0.25 
Program variables (infrastructure is excluded)           
  Soil conservation program present  0.041  0.49    0.077  1.11 
  Forestry program present  0.016  0.33    -0.029  -0.62 
  Water, social services, or other program present  -0.257  -2.84    -0.238  -2.58 
  Government project  0.163  2.95    0.147  2.82 
  Distance to site  -0.020  -1.40    -0.013  -1.17 
Sex x program variables           
  Soil conservation x female        -0.171  -1.52 
  Forestry x female        0.071  0.74 
  Water or social services x female        -0.046  -0.36 
  Government project x female        0.085  0.84 
  Distance x female        -0.046  -1.76 
Assets           
  Land in hectares (Round 1)  0.032  1.85    0.030  1.62 
  Value of livestock in Round 1 (1997 birr)  0.000  -1.80    0.000  -1.58 
Sex x assets           
  Land in Round 1 x female        -0.017  -0.57 
  Livestock in Round 1 x female        0.000  -1.12 
Community shocks           
  Community rainfall index (1 is best, leave-out mean)  -0.433  -3.07    -0.484  -3.19 
Household shocks (1 is best)           
  Rainfall index  0.163  2.42    0.158  2.22 
  Livestock index  0.044  0.23    -0.062  -0.33 
Sex x community shocks           
  Community rainfall index x female        0.242  1.11 
Sex x household shocks           
  Rainfall index x female        -0.001  -0.01 
  Livestock index x female        0.476  1.68 
F-test on interaction terms (p-values)           
  Sex x individual characteristics=0        5.47  0.24 
  Sex x household demographics=0        11.83  0.07 
  Sex x program variables=0        11.24  0.05 
  Sex x assets=0        1.97  0.37 
  Sex x community shocks=0        1.22  0.27 
  Sex x household shocks=0        2.90  0.23 
  All interactions=0        38.52  0.01 
  All gender terms=0        44.35  0.00 
Observed probability  0.18      0.18   
Predicted probability  0.13      0.11   
Number of observations  625      625   
Wald chi2(44)  85.3      122.68   
Prob > chi2    0.00      0.00   
Pseudo R2      0.17      0.23   
Note:  z-statistics in bold are significant at 10 percent or better.   58
Table 13.  Days worked, wages per day, and earnings from public works, 1997 
Individuals 15-65, seven villages with program information 
Heckman two-step estimates, selection equation with full interactions as in Table 12 
  Days worked    Wage per day    Earnings 
  Coefficient  z    Coefficient  z    Coefficient  z 
Individual characteristics                 
  Sex (1 = female)  233.451  0.79    2.279  0.07    -448.471  -0.34 
  Years of schooling  -7.558  -1.51    -0.797  -1.50    -26.373  -1.11 
  Experience  1.550  0.83    -0.037  -0.19    9.469  1.12 
  Experience squared  -0.040  -1.00    0.001  0.27    -0.296  -1.61 
  Height  0.498  0.45    0.068  0.55    -5.469  -1.01 
Sex x individual characteristics                 
  Years of schooling x female  3.189  0.38    0.635  0.73    14.568  0.40 
  Experience x female  -7.970  -2.00    0.286  0.70    -20.382  -1.40 
  Experience squared x female  0.165  1.80    -0.007  -0.78    0.507  1.54 
  Height x female  -0.849  -0.47    -0.008  -0.04    4.937  0.63 
Program variables                 
  Soil conservation program present  -25.497  -1.20    5.046  2.32    5.404  0.06 
  Forestry program present  41.935  3.00    -4.826  -3.28    61.748  1.03 
  Water, social services, or other program 
present  27.080  1.81    -4.844  -2.91    33.893  0.50 
  Government project  25.112  1.73    2.909  1.92    163.887  2.54 
  Distance to site  -3.248  -1.84    0.063  0.32    -12.908  -1.73 
Sex x program variables                 
  Soil conservation x female  -24.503  -0.56    -8.670  -1.90    -280.927  -1.49 
  Forestry x female  -40.634  -1.34    4.865  1.56    -63.074  -0.47 
  Water, social services, or other x female  -17.666  -0.55    -3.771  -1.11    -105.522  -0.72 
  Government project x female  -5.571  -0.16    5.746  1.74    2.334  0.02 
  Distance x female  8.297  0.92    -1.078  -1.09    -10.473  -0.28 
  Constant  -53.388  -0.27    -8.386  -0.38    980.873  1.01 
  Lambda  -2.185  -0.13    4.426  3.06    36.251  0.56 
F-test on interaction terms in main and 
selection equations (p-values)                 
  Sex x individual characteristics=0  1.99  0.92    2.46  0.87    7.73  0.26 
  Sex x household demographics=0  2.53  0.86    5.00  0.54    5.25  0.51 
  Sex x program variables=0  20.05  0.03    19.89  0.03    22.85  0.01 
  Sex x assets=0  4.83  0.09    3.86  0.15    5.21  0.07 
  Sex x community shocks=0  0.15  0.70    0.91  0.34    0.09  0.77 
  Sex x household shocks=0  1.30  0.52    1.57  0.46    1.97  0.37 
  All interactions=0  30.82  0.28    31.96  0.23    41.11  0.04 
  All gender effects=0  36.45  0.16    34.65  0.22    42.12  0.05 
                 
Number of observations  625      625      625   
Censored observations  526      540      528   
Uncensored observations  99      85      97   
                 
Wald chi2(25)  89.41      123.47      92.90   
Prob > chi2  0.00      0.00      0.00   
Note: z-statistics in bold are significant at 10 percent or better.   59
Table 14.  Reasons for nonapplication and nonparticipation in public works, by sex, 
1997 
Individuals 15-65 with information in public works module, seven villages with program data 
  Male      Female   
  Frequency  Percent    Frequency  Percent 
Applied for work to the public works work program           
  Yes  267  23.1    180  14.16 
  No  889  76.9    1,091  85.84 
For nonapplicants, reasons for not applying           
  Too weak/sick  75  8.65    111  10.38 
  Too young/old  100  11.53    176  16.46 
  Pregnant        34  3.18 
  Pay too low  21  2.42    7  0.65 
  Only poor work on such projects  7  0.81    8  0.75 
  Other job opportunities  45  5.19    22  2.06 
  Need labor on farm  284  32.76    48  4.49 
  Conflict with childcare/other responsibilities  29  3.34    285  26.66 
  Did not consider project useful        2  0.19 
  Did not like form of payment  1  0.12    5  0.47 
  Perceived no chance of being hired  108  12.46    130  12.16 
  No need  55  6.34    84  7.86 
  No jobs being offered  125  14.42    150  14.03 
  Studying  10  1.15    5  0.47 
  Not around  7  0.81    2  0.19 
If you applied, were you hired?           
  Yes  212  80.3    129  75.44 
  No  52  19.7    42  24.56 
Reason for not being hired           
  Too weak/sick  8  12.31    4  6.78 
  Too young/old  2  3.08    1  1.69 
  Not enough places  39  60.00    38  64.41 
  Conflict with PW staff/agents  5  7.69    5  8.47 
  Other  7  10.77    8  13.56 
  Considered richer  4  6.15    3  5.08 
Did you work in any other program?           
  Yes  221  92.47    132  87.42 
  No  18  7.53    19  12.58 
If not, why didn’t you work on another program?           
  Too weak/sick  3  21.43    5  33.33 
  Too young/old        2  13.33 
  Pay too low  1  7.14       
  Only poor work on such projects  1  7.14       
  Other job opportunities  1  7.14       
  Need labor on farm  1  7.14    2  13.33 
  Conflict with childcare/other responsibilities        1  6.67 
  Perceived no chance of being hired  4  28.57    4  26.67 
  No need  1  7.14       
  Not indicated  2  14.29    1  6.67 
Would you have wanted to work more?           
  Yes  190  91.35    114  91.20 
  No  18  8.65    11  8.80 
Reason for not wanting to work more           
  Project ended  180  80.00    46  60.53 
  No more work available due to rationing  14  10.37    12  15.79 
  Did not like form of payment        1  1.32 
  Work was too hard/too far  1  0.74    2  2.63 
  Physically unable to continue        4  5.26 
  Needed to work on own farm  7  5.19    6  7.89 
  Had other responsibilities  1  0.74    1  1.32 
  Had other job opportunities        1  1.32 
  Conflict with PW staff/agents        1  1.32 
  Unfairness in hiring  1  0.74    1  1.32 
  Other  3  2.22    1  1.32 
Source:  1997 ERHS, public works module.   60
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